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Skill

/oracle-manipulation

Detect oracle manipulation risks — spot-price reads from AMMs, stale Chainlink answers, single-source dependence, TWAP gaming. Activate whenever code reads a price, conversion rate, exchange rate, or `getReserves`, `latestAnswer`, `latestRoundData`, `consult`, `quote`, `slot0`,

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Install
$ npx -y skills add omermaksutii/RugProof --skill oracle-manipulation --agent claude-code

How it fires

How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.

  • Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
  • You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
  • Slash command/oracle-manipulation

Context preview

The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.

Detect oracle manipulation risks — spot-price reads from AMMs, stale Chainlink answers, single-source dependence, TWAP gaming. Activate whenever code reads a price, conversion rate, exchange rate, or `getReserves`, `latestAnswer`, `latestRoundData`, `consult`, `quote`, `slot0`,

SKILL.md

oracle-manipulation.SKILL.md
name: oracle-manipulation
description: Detect oracle manipulation risks — spot-price reads from AMMs, stale Chainlink answers, single-source dependence, TWAP gaming. Activate whenever code reads a price, conversion rate, exchange rate, or `getReserves`, `latestAnswer`, `latestRoundData`, `consult`, `quote`, `slot0`, `observe`, `getAmountsOut`.

Oracle manipulation detection

When this applies

Any code that consumes a price feed or derives a price from on-chain state:

  • Chainlink: `latestAnswer`, `latestRoundData`, `getRoundData`
  • Uniswap V2: `getReserves`, `getAmountsOut`, `price0Average`
  • Uniswap V3/V4: `slot0`, `observe`, `consult`
  • Curve: `get_virtual_price`, `get_dy`
  • Balancer: `getRate`
  • Custom oracle modules, on-chain TWAPs
  • LP token pricing, collateral valuation, liquidation thresholds, mint/burn rates

Detection patterns

Spot price from AMM (CRITICAL — funds at risk)

(uint112 r0, uint112 r1,) = pair.getReserves();
uint256 price = r1 * 1e18 / r0;       // ← flash-loan manipulable in one block

Stale Chainlink data (HIGH)

(, int256 answer,,,) = feed.latestRoundData();   // ← ignores updatedAt and answeredInRound

Required checks:

  • `updatedAt != 0`
  • `block.timestamp - updatedAt <= heartbeat` (with chain-specific tolerance)
  • `answeredInRound >= roundId`
  • `answer > 0`
  • Heartbeat sanity: ETH/USD is 1h on mainnet but 24h on some L2s — verify

`latestAnswer` (deprecated, no freshness) (HIGH)

int256 p = feed.latestAnswer();   // ← deprecated, prefer latestRoundData

Single-source dependence (HIGH)

Only one oracle, no fallback, no cross-check against a second source.

Uniswap V3 `slot0` without TWAP (CRITICAL)

(uint160 sqrtPriceX96,,,,,,) = pool.slot0();   // ← spot, manipulable

Use `observe()` for TWAP with sufficient lookback (≥30min for shallow pools).

Insufficient TWAP window (HIGH)

TWAP < 5 min on volatile assets or low-liquidity pools is gameable across two blocks.

Read-only reentrancy on oracle (HIGH)

Reading `getVirtualPrice` / `getReserves` mid-callback — see [[reentrancy]] §Read-only.

LP token priced via reserves directly (CRITICAL)

LP token price should use the *fair LP price* formula (Alpha Homora's method), not `reserve / totalSupply`.

Price scaling errors (HIGH)

Chainlink answers come in feed-specific decimals; mixing ETH/USD (8 decimals) with token (18 decimals) without normalizing produces silent off-by-1e10 errors.

Sequencer uptime ignored (HIGH on L2s)

On Arbitrum, Optimism, Base — must check `SequencerUptimeFeed` to avoid stale prices when sequencer is down.

Severity rubric

| Pattern | Severity | |---|---| | Spot-price from AMM used in liquidation/mint | **Critical** | | Uniswap V3 `slot0` used for collateral pricing | **Critical** | | LP token priced via raw `reserve / totalSupply` | **Critical** | | `latestRoundData` without freshness/round checks | **High** | | Single oracle, no fallback, financial-critical path | **High** | | Sequencer uptime check missing on L2 | **High** | | Insufficient TWAP window (<5min on shallow pool) | **High** | | Stale heartbeat for known-volatile asset | **High** | | `latestAnswer` (deprecated) used | **Medium** | | Decimal-scaling mistake | **High** |

Remediation patterns

  • For Chainlink: validate `(roundId, answer, , updatedAt, answeredInRound)` — guard against stale + zero + non-positive + round-mismatch.
  • Use multiple oracles with deviation check (e.g. Chainlink + Uniswap V3 TWAP with ≥30min window).
  • For LP tokens, use fair-LP-price math: `2 * sqrt(r0 * r1 * p0 * p1) / totalSupply`.
  • On L2s, integrate Chainlink's `SequencerUptimeFeed` (Arbitrum, Optimism, Base).
  • Avoid `slot0` and spot-price reads for anything that affects user funds.

False-positive notes

  • Display-only prices (UI/event metadata, not affecting fund flow) — Info-only.
  • `getReserves` used purely for ratio diagnostics with no downstream effect — Info.

Related

  • [[flash-loan-attacks]] — most oracle attacks are funded by flash loans
  • [[reentrancy]] — read-only reentrancy is an oracle-staleness issue
  • [[mev-frontrunning]] — TWAP-window timing
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