gouvernai-claude-code-plugin

Auto-approve what's safe. Gate what's risky. Block what's dangerous.

The problem

Claude Code's default permission prompts ask you to approve everything: a harmless file read gets the same interruption as a bulk delete. --dangerously-skip-permissions removes all prompts, giving you speed but zero safety net. Anthropic's auto mode uses a classifier you can't inspect or edit, and it's limited to Team and Enterprise plans.

The answer shouldn't be all-or-nothing. The goal is not "prompt on everything" or "trust auto mode," but a middle path: keep flow for ordinary work, add friction where risk rises, and hard-block the small class of actions that should never pass silently.

GouvernAI

GouvernAI is a runtime guardrails plugin for Claude Code. ~60% of typical agent actions (reads, drafts, navigation) pass through with zero gate — no prompt, no overhead. File writes auto-approve with a brief notification. Network calls, config changes, and credential access pause for approval. Obfuscated commands, credential exfiltration, and catastrophic operations are hard-blocked deterministically — Claude cannot override this.

Dual enforcement: a skill layer handles nuanced risk classification (is this Tier 2 or Tier 3?), while PreToolUse hooks enforce non-negotiable rules every time, no exceptions. All policy files are plain Markdown you can read and edit.

Risk	Actions	What happens
T1	reads, drafts, git status	Auto-approved. Zero overhead, zero friction.
T2	file writes, git commit	Auto-approved with brief notification. Keeps going unless you object.
T3	npm install, curl, email, config	Requires approval — pauses only when consequences are real.
T4	sudo, credential transmit, bulk delete	Requires approval after risk assessment — because it should.
BLOCKED	obfuscated commands, credential exfil	Hard block. No override. Even if Claude skips the skill.

Install

Step 1 — Add the marketplace and install the plugin

Run these in your terminal (not inside a Claude Code session):

claude plugin marketplace add Myr-Aya/GouvernAI-claude-code-plugin
claude plugin install gouvernai@mindxo

Step 2 — Activate guardrails in each session

After launching Claude Code (terminal or desktop), type:

/gouvernai

This activates the skill layer (risk classification, escalation rules, audit logging) and the hook layer (deterministic blocking of obfuscated commands, credential exfiltration, and catastrophic operations) for the rest of the session.

Why is this step needed? Claude Code has a known issue where plugin hooks defined in hooks/hooks.json are not loaded automatically on some platforms. Running /gouvernai activates the hooks registered in the skill's frontmatter, ensuring both enforcement layers are active. We're tracking this upstream — once resolved, guardrails will activate automatically with no manual step.

Hook activation (known Claude Code issue)

There is a known Claude Code bug where plugin hooks defined in hooks/hooks.json are discovered and matched but never fire for local and marketplace installs (see anthropics/claude-code#14410, #18547, #27398). This affects all plugins that ship hooks, not just GouvernAI.

Default workaround: Run /gouvernai at the start of your session. This loads the plugin and activates the hooks for the remainder of the session. The skill layer works regardless.

Manual hook registration (recommended for stricter security): Copy the hook configuration into your ~/.claude/settings.json so hooks fire from session start without requiring any command:

Note: If you use manual registration, ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} may not resolve in settings.json. Replace it with the absolute path to your installed plugin, for example:

• Linux/macOS: ~/.claude/plugins/cache/<marketplace>/<plugin>/<version>/scripts/guardrails-enforce.py
• Windows: %USERPROFILE%\.claude\plugins\cache\<marketplace>\<plugin>\<version>\scripts\guardrails-enforce.py

The tradeoff with manual registration is that hook config in settings.json does not auto-update when the plugin updates. After updating GouvernAI, check whether the hook configuration has changed and update settings.json accordingly.

Verify it's working

After activating, try these:

1. Auto-approved: git status — Tier 1, zero overhead
2. Auto-approved with notice: Ask Claude to write a file — Tier 2, brief notification, keeps going
3. Skill gate test: Ask Claude to delete several dummy files — you should see a 🛡️ T3 or T4 classification with an approval prompt
4. Hook block test: Ask Claude to write a file containing API_KEY = 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE' — the hook should block it with 🛡️ BLOCKED by guardrails hook

Usage

DefaultMode: GouvernAI complements Claude Code built-in guardrails with and extra safety layer.

With --dangerously-skip-permissions: If you already use Claude Code with native prompts disabled, GouvernAI adds back proportional safety — auto-approving routine work, gating risky actions, and hard-blocking dangerous patterns. This is where GouvernAI adds the most value.

Claude Code Desktop: If the skill doesn't auto-trigger, run /gouvernai at the start of your session to activate the gate.

What you'll see

Most of the time, GouvernAI auto-approves and stays invisible. ~60% of typical agent actions are reads, drafts, and navigation — auto-approved with zero overhead. When risk is real, it steps in proportionally:

/guardrails — Session status

Tier 2 — Notify and proceed

File write in the workspace. GouvernAI notifies and proceeds unless you object.

Tier 3 — Pause for approval

Package installation requires explicit approval before executing.

Tier 4 — Full stop (bulk delete with escalation)

Bulk file deletion: base tier T3 escalated to T4 for 9 targets. Lists every file and asks for confirmation.

Tier 4 — Full stop (email with escalation)

Outbound email to unfamiliar recipient: base tier T3 escalated to T4. Shows the escalation chain.

BLOCKED — Obfuscated command (hard constraint)

Base64-to-bash pipe detected and blocked. No override possible.

BLOCKED — Self-modification attempt (hard constraint)

Attempt to edit SKILL.md to remove the gate. Blocked with explanation and alternatives.

BLOCKED — Credential hardcoded in file

API key detected in file write. Shows the key, explains the risk, suggests alternatives.

Relaxed mode — T2 skips the gate

In relaxed mode, T2 actions proceed with no gate. T3 and T4 still require approval.

Audit log

Full session audit trail showing every gated action with tier, outcome, and escalation reason.

GouvernAI vs auto mode vs --dangerously-skip-permissions

Claude Code gives you three options for handling permissions. GouvernAI is designed to work with any of them — and adds the most value when native prompts are off.

	Default prompts	Auto mode	--dangerously-skip-permissions	+ GouvernAI
Routine actions	Prompted every time	Auto-allowed	No safety net	Auto-approved silently
Risky actions	Same prompt as routine	Binary allow/block	No safety net	Proportional gate (T3 pauses for approval)
Dangerous actions	Same prompt as routine	Binary allow/block	No safety net	Hard-blocked by hooks
Policy	Opaque, not editable	Opaque classifier	None	Transparent, editable files you own
Audit trail	None	None	None	Full log with tier, outcome, escalation
Modes	None	None	None	strict / relaxed / audit-only / token cap
Escalation rules	None	None	None	Bulk ops, unfamiliar targets, scope expansion
Cost governance	None	None	None	Token cap — pause when payload exceeds threshold
Plan required	Any	Team / Enterprise	Any	Any

With default prompts: GouvernAI works alongside them — adding tier classification, escalation rules, and an audit trail on top of the native permission system.

With auto mode: GouvernAI's PreToolUse hooks run before the auto mode classifier. It adds proportional controls, transparent policies, and persistent configuration on top of auto mode's binary allow/block.

With --dangerously-skip-permissions: If you've chosen to disable native prompts for speed, GouvernAI adds back a proportional safety layer. This is where it adds the most value — routine work stays fast, risky actions pause, dangerous patterns are hard-blocked.

GouvernAI works with any setup. It never requires you to change your permission mode.

Slash commands

Command	What it does
/guardrails	Show current mode, tier distribution, approvals/denials
/guardrails log	Display recent audit log entries
/guardrails strict	All tiers +1 — persisted to guardrails-mode.json
/guardrails relaxed	Tier 2 skips gate — persisted to guardrails-mode.json
/guardrails audit	Audit-only mode: T2/T3 auto-proceed, T4 halts (for CI/unattended)
/guardrails reset	Return to default full-gate mode
/guardrails policy	Display hard constraints
/guardrails tokencap <n>	Set token cap — actions exceeding <n> tokens pause for approval
/guardrails tokencap off	Disable token cap

Mode changes are written to guardrails-mode.json in the project root and persist across sessions and context resets. Previously, mode was held only in the model's context window and was silently lost on reset.

CI and unattended use

In full-gate mode, Tier 2 actions are auto-approved with notification — which becomes silent auto-approval when no human is watching. For scheduled tasks, CI pipelines, or any unattended run, set audit-only mode first:

/guardrails audit

In audit-only mode: T2 and T3 auto-proceed with full logging, T4 halts without executing. Hard constraints still block regardless of mode.

Token cap (cost governance)

Set a per-action token threshold. When an action's payload exceeds the cap, GouvernAI pauses for approval — same as a Tier 3 gate.

/guardrails tokencap 50000    # Set cap to 50K tokens
/guardrails tokencap off      # Disable
/guardrails tokencap          # Show current setting

The token cap is off by default. When enabled:

• Hook layer checks actual payload size (Write/Edit content, Bash command length) deterministically
• Skill layer estimates total cost of multi-step plans before executing
• Both use T3 controls: pause and require explicit approval
• Hard constraints still take priority — a dangerous action is blocked regardless of size
• Guardrails internal files (audit log, mode config) are exempt

Which mode should I use?

Use case	Recommended mode	Why
Solo coding, want flow	full-gate (default)	T2 auto-proceeds, T3 pauses only for real risk
Solo coding, maximum speed	relaxed	T2 skips gate entirely, T3+ still gated
Pair programming / review	strict	All tiers +1 for extra caution
CI / unattended / cron	audit	T2/T3 auto-proceed with logging, T4 halts
Cost-conscious usage	full-gate + tokencap	Adds a payload size gate on top of risk classification

How it works

Skill layer (probabilistic)

The SKILL.md file teaches Claude the 8-step gate process: identify, determine mode, classify (using ACTIONS.md), escalate (using TIERS.md), check pre-approval, check hard constraints (using POLICY.md), apply controls, log and execute. Claude reads and follows these instructions with judgment.

Hook layer (deterministic)

The PreToolUse hook (scripts/guardrails-enforce.py) runs on every Bash, Write, and Edit tool call. It checks for:

• Obfuscated commands — base64 decoding piped to bash, eval with encoded strings, hex-encoded commands
• Credential transmission — reading .env/secrets and piping to curl/wget/netcat
• Catastrophic commands — rm -rf /, fork bombs, dd to disk devices
• Credential in file writes — API keys, private keys, AWS access keys in committed files
• Self-modification — any attempt to edit guardrails files (skill files, enforcement script, hooks config, plugin metadata, command definitions) via Write, Edit, Bash redirect, or interpreter one-liners

If a violation is detected, the hook exits with code 2 (hard block). Claude cannot override this. If the hook cannot parse its input, it fails closed (blocks) rather than silently allowing the action through.

Why both?

Skills are probabilistic — Claude uses judgment about when to apply them. On complex tasks, it might skip classification. Hooks are deterministic — they run every time, no exceptions. The skill handles the nuanced risk classification (is this a Tier 2 or Tier 3?). The hooks enforce the non-negotiable rules (never transmit credentials, never run obfuscated commands).

Plugin structure

gouvernai/
├── .claude-plugin/
│   └── plugin.json              # Plugin metadata
├── skills/
│   └── gouvernai/
│       ├── SKILL.md             # Gate orchestrator (always loaded)
│       ├── ACTIONS.md           # Action → tier classification lookup
│       ├── TIERS.md             # Universal controls + escalation rules
│       ├── POLICY.md            # Hard constraints (NEVER rules)
│       └── GUIDE.md             # Output format templates
├── commands/
│   └── guardrails.md            # /guardrails slash command
├── hooks/
│   └── hooks.json               # PreToolUse hook configuration
├── scripts/
│   └── guardrails-enforce.py    # Deterministic enforcement script
├── tests/
│   └── test_guardrails_enforce.py  # Hook unit tests
└── README.md                    # This file

Runtime files written to the project root during use:

• guardrails_log.md — append-only audit log
• guardrails-mode.json — persisted mode config (created on first /guardrails mode command)

Environment variables

Variable	Set by	Purpose
CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT	Claude Code	Absolute path to the installed plugin directory. Used by hooks.json to locate guardrails-enforce.py.
CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR	Claude Code	Absolute path to the current project. Used by the hook and skill to locate guardrails_log.md and guardrails-mode.json.

If CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is not set, the hook command in hooks.json (python ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/guardrails-enforce.py) will fail to resolve the script path — the env var is required for the installed hook to work. When running guardrails-enforce.py directly (e.g. in tests or manual invocation), the script falls back to its own parent directory (scripts/../ = plugin root) as a convenience, but this fallback does not apply to the hook invocation itself.

Security

Important: This plugin installs hooks that run on every tool call. Review the source code before installing. The enforcement script (scripts/guardrails-enforce.py) is transparent and auditable.

In February 2026, Check Point Research disclosed CVEs allowing RCE through Claude Code hooks in untrusted repos. This plugin should be installed at user scope (default), not project scope, unless you trust all contributors to the project.

# Add the marketplace first
claude plugin marketplace add Myr-Aya/GouvernAI-claude-code-plugin

# User scope (default, recommended)
claude plugin install gouvernai@mindxo

# Project scope (only if you trust all contributors)
claude plugin install gouvernai@mindxo --scope project

Limitations

• Hooks cannot intercept MCP tool calls. If Claude uses MCP servers to execute actions, the PreToolUse hook does not fire. The skill layer still applies (Claude reads SKILL.md and classifies MCP actions), but there is no deterministic enforcement.
• Skill compliance varies by model. Tested on Claude Opus 4.6 and Claude Sonnet 4.6 — both show reliable gate compliance across all tiers. Smaller models (Haiku) may have lower compliance rates. Cross-model testing is ongoing.
• Hooks add ~10ms per tool call. The Python script is lightweight, but it runs on every Bash/Write/Edit/Read call. When token cap is enabled, the hook also reads guardrails-mode.json on each call to check the threshold.
• Hook patterns target Unix/Bash syntax. PowerShell equivalents (e.g. Get-Content, Invoke-WebRequest, Remove-Item) are not covered. Claude Code uses Bash on all platforms, so this is low risk for typical usage.
• Token cap uses a rough heuristic. Token estimation is ~4 characters per token. This is adequate for gating large payloads but not billing-accurate. The cap is a governance tool, not a cost calculator.

Threat model and limitations

GouvernAI is an operational safety and governance layer, not a security boundary. In the defense-in-depth model described by the 2026 International AI Safety Report, it sits at the runtime layer — gating agent actions before execution through a combination of linguistic classification and pattern-based blocking.

What's deterministic vs best-effort

Protection	Layer	Reliability
Obfuscated command blocking	Hook (deterministic)	Hard block, no override
Credential exfiltration (known patterns)	Hook (deterministic)	Hard block for matched patterns
Catastrophic commands (rm -rf /)	Hook (deterministic)	Hard block, no override
Self-modification prevention (full enforcement surface)	Hook (deterministic)	Hard block, no override
Credential in file writes	Hook (deterministic)	Hard block for matched patterns
Token cap (payload size)	Hook (deterministic)	Pause for approval when enabled
Risk tier classification (T1–T4)	Skill (probabilistic)	Model-dependent, ~90% on Sonnet 4.6
Escalation rules	Skill (probabilistic)	Model-dependent
Token cap (multi-step plan estimation)	Skill (probabilistic)	Heuristic-based
MCP tool governance	Skill only (no hook)	Best-effort, no deterministic backstop
Novel exfiltration techniques	Neither	Out of scope — use defense in depth

Its real value is:

• Catching accidental destructive actions before they happen
• Forcing a consistent approval and logging workflow across sessions
• Providing an auditable policy scaffold for teams
• Reducing variance between "careful" and "careless" agent sessions

It does not protect against sophisticated, determined adversaries. Regex-plus-prompt guardrails are effective at stopping mistakes, not targeted attacks.

What it catches:

• Credential exfiltration via pipe, variable staging, and command substitution from known secret files (.env, .pem, .key, .secret, credentials, id_rsa)
• Obfuscated command execution (base64 decode, eval, hex encoding, pipe to shell)
• Writes to any guardrails enforcement file (skill files, hook script, hooks.json, plugin metadata, command definitions)
• Interpreter-based self-modification attempts (python -c, node -e targeting guardrails paths)
• Catastrophic commands (rm -rf /, fork bombs, dd to disk)
• Credential exposure in file writes (API keys, private keys, AWS access keys in committed files)
• Unintentional scope expansion (escalation rules via skill layer)
• Large-payload actions exceeding a user-defined token cap (when enabled)

What it does NOT catch:

• Multi-step exfiltration where credentials are staged across separate commands using non-keyword variable names
• Fragmented data extraction (one character at a time)
• Credential embedding in generated files that are later transmitted in a separate action
• Exfiltration disguised as legitimate work (health checks, config generation)
• Attacks routed through MCP tools (hook layer bypassed entirely — skill layer provides best-effort coverage)
• Novel obfuscation techniques not covered by current regex patterns
• Prompt injection that convinces the model to ignore the skill layer
• Variable staging from non-secret file extensions (e.g. .txt, .yaml — only known secret file patterns are matched)

Defense in depth: GouvernAI is one layer in a multi-layer safety stack. For production or high-security environments, complement it with:

• Network egress policies — restrict which external endpoints the agent can reach
• Secret vaults — never expose raw credential values to the agent; use short-lived tokens
• Sandboxed execution — run agent actions in isolated environments with limited blast radius
• DLP monitoring — detect and alert on sensitive data leaving the environment
• Audit and incident response — GouvernAI's log provides the audit trail; pair it with alerting and review processes

No single layer is sufficient. The 2026 International AI Safety Report's Swiss cheese model applies: each layer has holes, but layered together they provide meaningful protection.

Uninstallation

To uninstall: claude plugin uninstall gouvernai@mindxo and claude plugin marketplace remove mindxo

or go to Browse plugins → Personal → select the plugin → Uninstall.

License

MIT — see LICENSE

Website: gouvernai.ai

Built by Myr-Aya, MindXO