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/aegis

Flag security-relevant file changes for re-audit

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myclaude-creator-engine
2515 skills5 agents
Install
$ npx -y skills add myclaude-sh/myclaude-creator-engine --skill aegis --agent claude-code

How it fires

How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.

  • Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
  • You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
  • Slash command/aegis

Context preview

The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.

Flag security-relevant file changes for re-audit

SKILL.md

aegis.SKILL.md
name: aegis
description: >
  SAST security audit: STRIDE threat model, 300+ vuln patterns, 8 compliance frameworks, auto-fix,
  hardening. Use when: audit code, find vulnerabilities, compliance check, threat model, secrets scan,
  CVE review. NOT for: DAST, pentesting.
allowed-tools:
  - Read
  - Write
  - Edit
  - Glob
  - Grep
  - Bash
hooks:
  PostToolUse:
    - matcher: "Write|Edit"
      description: "Flag security-relevant file changes for re-audit"

AEGIS — AI Code Auditor Security Skill

When to Use

  • Audit codebase security before deployment or release
  • Find vulnerabilities in code (SAST-style analysis)
  • Security review of pull requests or new features
  • Check compliance against OWASP, NIST, CIS, PCI DSS, SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, HIPAA
  • Harden project security (headers, validation, hooks, CI/CD)
  • Fix security issues with auto/guided transforms
  • Threat model an application using STRIDE
  • Check for hardcoded secrets or credentials
  • Review dependencies for known CVEs
  • Generate security headers or Content Security Policy

When NOT to Use

  • Runtime/dynamic testing (DAST) — AEGIS is static analysis only, not a runtime scanner
  • Network penetration testing — use dedicated pentest tools (Burp, nmap, Metasploit)
  • Physical security assessments — out of scope entirely
  • Non-code projects — AEGIS needs source code to analyze
  • Already-deployed incidents — use incident response tooling, not audit tooling
  • Performance testing disguised as DoS checks — AEGIS flags DoS vectors, doesn't load-test

---

Question System

Before starting analysis, check for these inputs:

| Input | Required | If Missing | |-------|----------|-----------| | Project path / codebase | Yes | Use current working directory. If empty, ask: "Which project should I audit?" | | Engagement mode (RAPID/STANDARD/DEEP) | No | Default to STANDARD. Infer RAPID if user says "quick check" or "PR review". Infer DEEP if "pre-release" or "full audit". | | Specific focus area | No | Audit everything. If user mentions "auth", "uploads", "API", focus STRIDE on those entry points first. | | Compliance frameworks needed | No | Default to OWASP Top 10. Add others if user mentions "SOC 2", "PCI", "HIPAA", etc. | | Fix authorization | No | Always ask before applying auto-fixes. Never fix without confirmation. |

---

Boot Protocol

1. Identify project: framework, language, stack from package.json/config files 2. Select engagement mode based on user request:

  • **RAPID** (<15 min): Secrets + deps + top 25 patterns. Use for PR review, quick checks.
  • **STANDARD** (30-60 min): Full STRIDE + 300 patterns + compliance. Default for "audit my code."
  • **DEEP** (2-4 hours): Full PASTA + attack trees + supply chain + all infra. Pre-release audits.

3. Build Security Context Object (SCO): entry points, trust boundaries, data flows 4. Execute the three cycles: AUDIT -> FIX -> HARDEN

Foundational Axioms (non-negotiable)

Every finding must trace to one or more:

| # | Axiom | Implication | |---|-------|-------------| | A1 | CIA Triad | Every finding maps to C, I, or A violation | | A2 | Least Privilege | Default-deny. Verify every permission grant | | A3 | Defense in Depth | Single control failure must not cause breach | | A4 | Zero Trust | Every trust boundary crossing requires auth+authz | | A5 | Secure by Default | Detect opt-in to insecure behavior | | A6 | Fail Secure | Error handlers must not leak data or bypass auth | | A7 | Complete Mediation | Every access request must be checked | | A8 | Economy of Mechanism | Flag unnecessary complexity as attack surface | | A9 | Open Design | Security must not depend on obscurity |

CYCLE 1: AUDIT (Detect & Classify)

Phase 1: Reconnaissance — Build SCO

Enumerate automatically:

  • **Entry points:** HTTP routes, WebSocket, file uploads, CLI args, scheduled jobs
  • **Trust boundaries:** client->server, unauth->auth, user->admin, app->db, internal->external
  • **Data flows:** input sources -> transforms -> sinks (trace taint)
  • **Dependencies:** lockfile -> CVE scan
  • **Infrastructure:** Dockerfile, K8s manifests, Firebase rules, Terraform, CI/CD
  • **Secrets:** scan for hardcoded credentials (patterns from `references/detection-patterns.md` §1)

Compute **RASQ** (attack surface score):

RASQ = Sum(entry_points x weight x multipliers)
Weights: unauth_http=10, auth_http=5, websocket=8, file_upload=9, webhook=7, server_action=7
Multipliers: handles_PII=x2, internet_facing=x1.5, rate_limited=x0.5, auth_required=x0.7

Phase 2: STRIDE Threat Model

For each entry point and trust boundary, evaluate all 6 STRIDE categories. Load category definitions, key questions, and detection patterns from `references/axioms-and-stride.md`.

| Category | Violated Property | |----------|------------------| | **S** Spoofing | Authentication | | **T** Tampering | Integrity | | **R** Repudiation | Non-repudiation | | **I** Info Disclosure | Confidentiality | | **D** Denial of Service | Availability | | **E** Elevation | Authorization |

Phase 3: Detection Engine (6 Layers)

Execute in order. Each layer feeds the next.

| Layer | What | Reference | |-------|------|-----------| | 1. SECRET SCAN | Credential pattern matching | `references/detection-patterns.md` §1 | | 2. DEPENDENCY SCAN | CVE + supply chain analysis | `references/detection-patterns.md` §2 | | 3. PATTERN MATCH | Code pattern detection by CWE/OWASP | `references/detection-patterns.md` §3 | | 4. TAINT ANALYSIS | Input source → sink tracing | `references/detection-patterns.md` §4 | | 5. SEMANTIC REASONING | Context-aware analysis (business logic) | AI-native reasoning | | 6. COMPLIANCE MAP | Framework control verification | `references/compliance-matrix.md` |

Layer 4 traces untrusted inputs through transforms to sensitive sinks. Load source/sink definitions and neutralizer catalog from `references/detection-patterns.md` §4.

Phase 4: Risk Scoring (5 Dimensions)

RISK = (Severity x 0.8) + (Confidence x 0.4) +
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Ships withmyclaude-creator-engine

The creation pipeline for Claude Code products — research, create, validate, publish. 13 types, 20 quality patterns, zero coding required.

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Repo: myclaude-sh/myclaude-creator-engine

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