/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk

name: analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
description: 'Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to
  detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and
  lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC
  analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or
  perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.

  '
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: soc-operations
tags:
- soc
- splunk
- windows-events
- sysmon
- event-logs
- mitre-attack
- active-directory
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques:
- Restore Access
- Password Authentication
- Biometric Authentication
- Strong Password Policy
- Restore User Account Access
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
- DE.AE-06
mitre_attack:
- T1110
- T1053.005
- T1547.001
- T1021.002
- T1558.003
- T1003.006

Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk

When to Use

Use this skill when:

• SOC analysts investigate alerts related to Windows authentication, process execution, or AD changes
• Detection engineers build SPL queries for Windows-based threat detection
• Incident responders need forensic timelines of Windows endpoint or domain controller activity
• Periodic threat hunting targets Windows-specific ATT&CK techniques

**Do not use** for Linux/macOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.

Prerequisites

• Splunk with Windows Event Log data ingested (sourcetype `WinEventLog:Security`, `WinEventLog:System`, `XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`)
• Sysmon deployed on endpoints with SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong configuration
• CIM data model acceleration for Endpoint and Authentication data models
• Knowledge of Windows Security Event IDs and Sysmon event types

Workflow

Step 1: Authentication Attack Detection

**Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):**

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users
  by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status
| where count > 20
| eval attack_type = case(
    Logon_Type=3, "Network Brute Force",
    Logon_Type=10, "RDP Brute Force",
    Logon_Type=2, "Interactive Brute Force",
    1=1, "Other"
  )
| eval status_meaning = case(
    Status="0xc000006d", "Bad Username or Password",
    Status="0xc000006a", "Incorrect Password (valid user)",
    Status="0xc0000234", "Account Locked Out",
    Status="0xc0000072", "Account Disabled",
    1=1, Status
  )
| sort - count
| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users

**Password Spray Detection:**

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3
| bin _time span=10m
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,
  values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time
| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts < unique_users * 3
| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")

**Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):**

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!="127.0.0.1"
| sort _time
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,
  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,
  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes
  by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0
| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)/60, 1)
| sort - failures

Step 2: Privilege Escalation Detection

**New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):**

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| join TargetUserName type=left [
    search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName="Administrators"
    | rename MemberName AS TargetUserName
  ]
| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| eval alert = "New account created and added to Administrators group"

**Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):**

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4672
SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" SubjectUserName!="LOCAL SERVICE" SubjectUserName!="NETWORK SERVICE"
| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| where count > 0
| search privileges IN ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege",
  "SeRestorePrivilege", "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege")

**Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):**

index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)")
| sort - count

Step 3: Persistence Mechanism Detection

**Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):**

index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
  OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)
| search task_info="*powershell*" OR task_info="*cmd*" OR task_info="*http*" OR task_info="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info

**Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):**

index=sysmon EventCode=13
TargetObject IN (
  "*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
  "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
  "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*",
  "*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*"
)
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details
| where NOT match(Image, "(explorer\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)")
| sort - count

**WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):**

index=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21
| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace
| where count > 0

Step 4: Lateral Movement Detection

**Remote Service Exploita