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/analyzing-command-and-control-communication

Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom

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cybersecurity-skills
36k200 skills

Claude Code

$ npx -y skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-command-and-control-communication --agent claude-code

SKILL.md

analyzing-command-and-control-communication.SKILL.md
name: analyzing-command-and-control-communication
description: 'Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom
  protocols to reverse-engineer beacon patterns, command structures, data encoding,
  and infrastructure (primary servers, fallback domains, dead drops). Use after
  reverse engineering reveals network traffic needing protocol analysis or when
  building detection signatures for a framework like Cobalt Strike, Metasploit,
  or Sliver.

  '
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: malware-analysis
tags:
- malware
- C2
- command-and-control
- beacon
- protocol-analysis
version: 1.0.0
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- DE.AE-02
- RS.AN-03
- ID.RA-01
- DE.CM-01
mitre_attack:
- T1071.001
- T1573
- T1571
- T1008
- T1095

Analyzing Command-and-Control Communication

When to Use

  • Reverse engineering a malware sample has revealed network communication that needs protocol analysis
  • Building network-level detection signatures for a specific C2 framework (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver)
  • Mapping C2 infrastructure including primary servers, fallback domains, and dead drops
  • Analyzing encrypted or encoded C2 traffic to understand the command set and data format
  • Attributing malware to a threat actor based on C2 infrastructure patterns and tooling

**Do not use** for general network anomaly detection; this is specifically for understanding known or suspected C2 protocols from malware analysis.

Prerequisites

  • PCAP capture of malware network traffic (from sandbox, network tap, or full packet capture)
  • Wireshark/tshark for packet-level analysis
  • Reverse engineering tools (Ghidra, dnSpy) for understanding C2 code in the malware binary
  • Python 3.8+ with `scapy`, `dpkt`, and `requests` for protocol analysis and replay
  • Threat intelligence databases for C2 infrastructure correlation (VirusTotal, Shodan, Censys)
  • JA3/JA3S fingerprint databases for TLS-based C2 identification

Workflow

Step 1: Identify the C2 Channel

Determine the protocol and transport used for C2 communication:

C2 Communication Channels:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
HTTP/HTTPS:     Most common; uses standard web traffic to blend in
                Indicators: Regular POST/GET requests, specific URI patterns, custom headers

DNS:            Tunneling data through DNS queries and responses
                Indicators: High-volume TXT queries, long subdomain names, high entropy

Custom TCP/UDP: Proprietary binary protocol on non-standard port
                Indicators: Non-HTTP traffic on high ports, unknown protocol

ICMP:           Data encoded in ICMP echo/reply payloads
                Indicators: ICMP packets with large or non-standard payloads

WebSocket:      Persistent bidirectional connection for real-time C2
                Indicators: WebSocket upgrade followed by binary frames

Cloud Services: Using legitimate APIs (Telegram, Discord, Slack, GitHub)
                Indicators: API calls to cloud services from unexpected processes

Email:          SMTP/IMAP for C2 commands and data exfiltration
                Indicators: Automated email operations from non-email processes

Step 2: Analyze Beacon Pattern

Characterize the periodic communication pattern:

from scapy.all import rdpcap, IP, TCP
from collections import defaultdict
import statistics
import json

packets = rdpcap("c2_traffic.pcap")

# Group TCP SYN packets by destination
connections = defaultdict(list)
for pkt in packets:
    if IP in pkt and TCP in pkt and (pkt[TCP].flags & 0x02):
        key = f"{pkt[IP].dst}:{pkt[TCP].dport}"
        connections[key].append(float(pkt.time))

# Analyze each destination for beaconing
for dst, times in sorted(connections.items()):
    if len(times) < 3:
        continue

    intervals = [times[i+1] - times[i] for i in range(len(times)-1)]
    avg_interval = statistics.mean(intervals)
    stdev = statistics.stdev(intervals) if len(intervals) > 1 else 0
    jitter_pct = (stdev / avg_interval * 100) if avg_interval > 0 else 0
    duration = times[-1] - times[0]

    beacon_data = {
        "destination": dst,
        "connections": len(times),
        "duration_seconds": round(duration, 1),
        "avg_interval_seconds": round(avg_interval, 1),
        "stdev_seconds": round(stdev, 1),
        "jitter_percent": round(jitter_pct, 1),
        "is_beacon": 5 < avg_interval < 7200 and jitter_pct < 25,
    }

    if beacon_data["is_beacon"]:
        print(f"[!] BEACON DETECTED: {dst}")
        print(f"    Interval: {avg_interval:.0f}s +/- {stdev:.0f}s ({jitter_pct:.0f}% jitter)")
        print(f"    Sessions: {len(times)} over {duration:.0f}s")

Step 3: Decode C2 Protocol Structure

Reverse engineer the message format from captured traffic:

# HTTP-based C2 protocol analysis
import dpkt
import base64

with open("c2_traffic.pcap", "rb") as f:
    pcap = dpkt.pcap.Reader(f)

for ts, buf in pcap:
    eth = dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(buf)
    if not isinstance(eth.data, dpkt.ip.IP):
        continue
    ip = eth.data
    if not isinstance(ip.data, dpkt.tcp.TCP):
        continue
    tcp = ip.data

    if tcp.dport == 80 or tcp.dport == 443:
        if len(tcp.data) > 0:
            try:
                http = dpkt.http.Request(tcp.data)
                print(f"\n--- C2 REQUEST ---")
                print(f"Method: {http.method}")
                print(f"URI: {http.uri}")
                print(f"Headers: {dict(http.headers)}")
                if http.body:
                    print(f"Body ({len(http.body)} bytes):")
                    # Try Base64 decode
                    try:
                        decoded = base64.b64decode(http.body)
                        print(f"  Decoded: {decoded[:200]}")
                    except:
                        print(f"  Raw: {http.body[:200]}")
            except:
                pass

Step 4: Identify C2 Framework

Match observed patterns to known C2 frameworks:

Known C2 Framework Signatu
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@mukul975
Ships withcybersecurity-skills

817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains · Apache 2.0

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analyzing-command-and-control-communication installs in Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, OpenCode and Windsurf with the skills CLI, using each agent's flag shown on this page. Flowy's auto-invocation, which fires a skill when your prompt matches, runs in Claude Code only.