/moai-ref-owasp-checklist

name: moai-ref-owasp-checklist
description: >
  OWASP Top 10 security checklist, authentication patterns, input validation,
  and HTTP security headers reference. Agent-extending skill that amplifies
  backend-implementation and security-audit workflows with production-grade security patterns.
  NOT for: frontend UI, DevOps deployment, performance optimization, testing strategy.

when_to_use: >
  Use for security reference: OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities (injection,
  XSS, CSRF), authentication patterns, input validation, and HTTP security
  headers. Amplifies backend-implementation and security-audit workflows with
  production-grade security patterns.

user-invocable: false
metadata:
  version: "1.0.0"
  category: "domain"
  status: "active"
  updated: "2026-03-30"
  tags: "owasp, security, checklist, authentication, validation, reference"

# MoAI Extension: Progressive Disclosure
progressive_disclosure:
  enabled: true
  level1_tokens: 100
  level2_tokens: 3000

OWASP Security Checklist Reference

Target Agents

• `manager-develop` - Applies checklist during backend API implementation (`cycle_type=tdd` or `cycle_type=ddd` context)
• `/moai review` with a security focus - Primary security-audit invocation surface; equivalently available as a per-spawn `Agent(general-purpose)` security specialist per `archived-agent-rejection.md` §C

OWASP API Security Top 10

| Rank | Vulnerability | Check | Defense | |------|-------------|-------|---------| | A1 | **BOLA** (Broken Object Level Authorization) | Can user A access user B's resources? | Verify object ownership at every endpoint | | A2 | **Broken Authentication** | Weak passwords, unlimited login attempts? | bcrypt (cost 12+), rate limit, MFA | | A3 | **Broken Object Property Level Authorization** | Are hidden fields exposed in responses? | Response DTOs, field-level filtering | | A4 | **Unrestricted Resource Consumption** | Can mass requests crash the server? | Rate limiting, enforce pagination limits | | A5 | **Broken Function Level Authorization** | Can regular users call admin APIs? | RBAC middleware, permission checks | | A6 | **Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows** | Can a sensitive flow be automated or abused in bulk? | Flow-level rate limits, anomaly detection, challenge on abuse signals | | A7 | **SSRF** (Server-Side Request Forgery) | Can URL input reach internal or metadata endpoints? | Egress allowlist, block internal/metadata ranges, validate fetch targets | | A8 | **Security Misconfiguration** | Debug mode, verbose errors, or default accounts exposed? | Production-hardened config, security headers, inspect deployed config | | A9 | **Improper Inventory Management** | Undocumented, shadow, or old-version endpoints reachable? | Maintain an API inventory; deprecate and decommission old versions | | A10 | **Unsafe Consumption of APIs** | Are external/third-party API responses trusted blindly? | Validate external responses against a schema, set timeouts, treat upstream data as untrusted |

Authentication Checklist

Password Policy

• Minimum 8 characters, show strength meter (not strict rules)
• bcrypt (cost factor 12+) or Argon2id
• Temporary lock after 5 failed attempts (15 min) or CAPTCHA
• Prevent reuse of last 5 passwords

JWT Configuration

| Setting | Recommended Value | |---------|------------------| | Access Token Expiry | 15-30 minutes | | Refresh Token Expiry | 7-14 days | | Algorithm | RS256 (asymmetric) or HS256 | | Storage | httpOnly + secure + sameSite cookie | | Payload | Minimal: userId, role only (no PII) | | Renewal | Silent refresh or token rotation |

Session Security

• Regenerate session ID after login
• Invalidate session on logout (server-side)
• Set session timeout (30 min idle)
• Bind session to IP/User-Agent (optional, strict)

HTTP Security Headers

| Header | Value | Purpose | |--------|-------|---------| | `Strict-Transport-Security` | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` | Force HTTPS | | `X-Content-Type-Options` | `nosniff` | Prevent MIME sniffing | | `X-Frame-Options` | `DENY` or `SAMEORIGIN` | Prevent clickjacking | | `Content-Security-Policy` | `default-src 'self'` | Prevent XSS | | `Referrer-Policy` | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` | Limit referrer | | `Permissions-Policy` | `camera=(), microphone=()` | Restrict browser features |

Input Validation Checklist

| Type | Method | Tool | |------|--------|------| | Schema validation | Type + structure check | Zod, Joi, pydantic, Go validator | | Length limits | Min/max constraints | Schema definitions | | SQL Injection | Parameterized queries | ORM (Prisma, GORM, SQLAlchemy) | | XSS Prevention | HTML escaping | DOMPurify (client), server escape | | Path Traversal | Path normalization | filepath.Clean + whitelist | | File Upload | Type + size validation | MIME type + magic number check | | CORS | Origin whitelist | Never `origin: '*'` with credentials |

Sensitive Data Handling

| Data Type | Storage | Transmission | Logging | |----------|---------|-------------|---------| | Passwords | bcrypt hash only | HTTPS only | NEVER | | API Keys | Environment variables | Header (Authorization) | Masked (first 4 chars) | | PII | Encrypted (AES-256) | HTTPS only | Masked | | Credit Cards | Tokenized (payment provider) | Provider SDK | NEVER | | Sessions | httpOnly cookie | HTTPS only | NEVER |

Security Review Severity Levels

| Level | Label | Action | Example | |-------|-------|--------|---------| | P0 | CRITICAL | Block release | SQL injection, auth bypass | | P1 | HIGH | Fix before merge | Missing authorization check | | P2 | MEDIUM | Fix within sprint | Weak password policy | | P3 | LOW | Track in backlog | Missing security header |

Trust Boundary Verification Principles

| Principle | Applies To | Defense | |-----------|------------|---------| | Cached/client-supplied session state is not proof of current identity | Any framework caching or locally decoding a session/JWT value | Re-verify identity a