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Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through
Deploying Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access for SASE-based zero trust network access using GlobalProtect agents,
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Deploying Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access for SASE-based zero trust network access using GlobalProtect agents,
name: deploying-palo-alto-prisma-access-zero-trust description: 'Deploying Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access for SASE-based zero trust network access using GlobalProtect agents, ZTNA Connectors, security policy enforcement, and integration with Strata Cloud Manager for unified security management. ' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: zero-trust-architecture tags: - prisma-access - palo-alto - ztna - sase - globalprotect - strata-cloud-manager - zero-trust version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_ai_rmf: - GOVERN-1.1 - MEASURE-2.7 - MANAGE-3.1 nist_csf: - PR.AA-01 - PR.AA-05 - PR.IR-01 - GV.PO-01
**Do not use** for small organizations (< 200 users) where simpler ZTNA solutions suffice, for environments requiring only web application access without full network security, or when budget constraints preclude enterprise SASE licensing.
Set up the cloud infrastructure for mobile user and remote network connections.
Strata Cloud Manager > Prisma Access > Infrastructure Settings: Mobile Users Configuration: - Service Connection: Auto-selected based on user location - DNS Servers: 10.1.1.10, 10.1.1.11 (corporate DNS) - IP Pool for Mobile Users: 10.100.0.0/16 - Authentication: SAML with Okta (Primary), Entra ID (Secondary) - GlobalProtect Portal: portal.company.com - GlobalProtect Gateway: Auto (nearest Prisma Access location) Infrastructure Subnet: - Range: 172.16.0.0/16 - Allocation: /24 per Prisma Access location
Install ZTNA Connectors to provide secure access to internal applications.
# Deploy ZTNA Connector on VMware (OVA)
# Download OVA from Strata Cloud Manager > Prisma Access > ZTNA Connectors
# AWS deployment via CloudFormation
aws cloudformation create-stack \
--stack-name prisma-ztna-connector \
--template-url https://prisma-access-connector-templates.s3.amazonaws.com/ztna-connector-aws.yaml \
--parameters \
ParameterKey=VpcId,ParameterValue=vpc-PROD \
ParameterKey=SubnetId,ParameterValue=subnet-PRIVATE \
ParameterKey=InstanceType,ParameterValue=m5.xlarge \
ParameterKey=TenantServiceGroup,ParameterValue=TSG_ID \
ParameterKey=ConnectorName,ParameterValue=dc-east-connector-01
# Verify connector registration
# Strata Cloud Manager > Prisma Access > ZTNA Connectors
# Status should show "Connected" with nearest Prisma Access location
# Deploy second connector for HA
# ZTNA Connector auto-discovers nearest Prisma Access location
# IPSec tunnel uses: ecp384/aes256/sha512 for IKE and ESP
# Bandwidth: up to 2 Gbps per connectorCreate application definitions pointing to internal applications via ZTNA Connectors.
Strata Cloud Manager > Prisma Access > Applications: Application 1: Internal Wiki - FQDN: wiki.internal.corp - Port: TCP 443 - ZTNA Connector: dc-east-connector-01 - Protocol: HTTPS - Health Check: Enabled (HTTP GET /health) Application 2: Source Code Repository - FQDN: git.internal.corp - Ports: TCP 22, 443 - ZTNA Connector: dc-east-connector-01, dc-east-connector-02 - Protocol: HTTPS, SSH Application 3: Finance ERP - FQDN: erp.internal.corp - Port: TCP 443 - ZTNA Connector: dc-east-connector-01 - Protocol: HTTPS - User Authentication: Required (re-auth every 2h) Strata Cloud Manager > Policies > Security Policy: Rule 1: Engineering Access to Dev Tools Source: User Group "Engineering" (from Okta SAML) Destination: Application "Source Code Repository", "Internal Wiki" HIP Profile: "Managed Device with CrowdStrike" Action: Allow Logging: Enabled Threat Prevention: Best Practice profile Rule 2: Finance Access to ERP Source: User Group "Finance" Destination: Application "Finance ERP" HIP Profile: "Compliant Device - High Security" Action: Allow SSL Decryption: Forward Proxy DLP Profile: "Financial Data Protection" Rule 3: Default Deny Private Apps Source: Any Destination: Any Private App Action: Deny Logging: Enabled
Define device posture requirements using HIP checks.
Strata Cloud Manager > Objects > GlobalProtect > HIP Objects: HIP Object: "CrowdStrike Running" - Vendor: CrowdStrike - Product: Falcon Sensor - Is Running: Yes - Minimum Version: 7.10 HIP Object: "Disk Encryption Enabled" - Windows: BitLocker = Encrypted - macOS: FileVault = Encrypted HIP Object: "OS Patch Level" - Windows: >= 10.0.22631 - macOS: >= 14.0 HIP Profile: "Managed Device with CrowdStrike" - Match: "CrowdStrike Running" AND "Disk Encryption Enabled" HIP Profile: "Compliant Device - High Security" - Match: "CrowdStrike Running" AND "Disk Encryption Enabled" AND "OS Patch Level"
Roll out the GlobalProtect agent for secure connectivity.
# Deploy GlobalProtect via Intune (Windows) # MSI download from Str
Open-source security arsenal for AI coding agents: 784 cybersecurity skills, scanner integrations, and a security MCP for Claude Code, Cursor, opencode, Gemini CLI, Cline, and any agentskills.io agent. Mapped to OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF, D3FEND, ATLAS.
Repo: Mikaru0Mystic/sectinel
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