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/analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts

Parses and analyzes the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive to extract evidence of program execution, application

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$ npx -y skills add Mikaru0Mystic/sectinel --skill analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts --agent claude-code

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Parses and analyzes the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive to extract evidence of program execution, application

SKILL.md

analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts.SKILL.md
name: analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts
description: 'Parses and analyzes the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive to extract evidence of program execution, application
  installation, and driver loading for digital forensics investigations. Uses Eric Zimmerman''s AmcacheParser and Timeline
  Explorer for artifact extraction, SHA-1 hash correlation with threat intel, and timeline reconstruction. Activates for requests
  involving Amcache forensics, program execution evidence, Windows artifact analysis, or application compatibility cache investigation.

  '
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: digital-forensics
tags:
- amcache
- windows-forensics
- program-execution
- AmcacheParser
- eric-zimmerman
- timeline-analysis
- DFIR
version: 1.0.0
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.AN-01
- RS.AN-03
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01

Analyzing Windows Amcache Artifacts

When to Use

  • Determining which programs have existed or executed on a Windows system during incident response
  • Correlating SHA-1 hashes from Amcache against known malware databases (VirusTotal, CIRCL, MISP)
  • Building an application installation and execution timeline for forensic investigations
  • Identifying deleted executables that leave traces in Amcache even after file removal
  • Investigating insider threats by documenting which portable or unauthorized applications were present
  • Analyzing driver loading history to detect rootkits or malicious kernel modules

**Do not use** as sole proof of program execution. Amcache proves file existence and metadata registration, but ShimCache (AppCompatCache) and Prefetch provide stronger execution evidence. Use all three artifacts together for conclusive analysis.

Prerequisites

  • A forensic image or live triage copy of `C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve` (and associated `.LOG1`, `.LOG2` transaction logs)
  • Eric Zimmerman's AmcacheParser (`AmcacheParser.exe`) downloaded from https://ericzimmerman.github.io/
  • Eric Zimmerman's Timeline Explorer for viewing parsed CSV output
  • Optionally: Registry Explorer for manual hive inspection
  • A SHA-1 whitelist of known-good executables (e.g., NSRL hashset) for filtering
  • .NET 6+ runtime installed (required by current EZ tools)
  • Write access to an output directory for CSV results

Workflow

Step 1: Acquire the Amcache.hve File

Extract the Amcache hive from a forensic image or live system:

# From a live system (requires elevated privileges and raw copy tool)
# Amcache.hve is locked by the system; use a raw disk copy tool
# Option A: FTK Imager - mount image and navigate to:
# C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve
# Also collect: Amcache.hve.LOG1, Amcache.hve.LOG2

# Option B: Using KAPE for automated triage collection
kape.exe --tsource C: --tdest D:\Evidence\%m --target Amcache

# Option C: From a mounted forensic image (E: = mounted image)
copy "E:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve" D:\Evidence\
copy "E:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.LOG1" D:\Evidence\
copy "E:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.LOG2" D:\Evidence\

Always collect the transaction log files (`.LOG1`, `.LOG2`) alongside the hive. AmcacheParser replays uncommitted transactions from these logs to recover the most complete data.

Step 2: Parse Amcache with AmcacheParser

Run AmcacheParser against the acquired hive:

# Basic parsing with CSV output
AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output"

# Parse with a SHA-1 whitelist to exclude known-good entries (NSRL)
AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" -w "D:\Whitelists\nsrl_sha1.txt" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output"

# Parse with a SHA-1 inclusion list (only show matches against known-bad hashes)
AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" -b "D:\IOCs\malware_sha1.txt" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output"

# Include deleted entries with high-precision timestamps
AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output" -i --mp

AmcacheParser produces multiple CSV files in the output directory:

| Output File | Contents | |-------------|----------| | `Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv` | File entries with SHA-1 hashes, paths, sizes, and timestamps | | `Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv` | Orphaned file entries from older Amcache format | | `Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv` | Installed program metadata (name, publisher, version, install date) | | `Amcache_DeviceContainers.csv` | USB and device connection history | | `Amcache_DevicePnps.csv` | Plug-and-Play device driver information | | `Amcache_DriverBinaries.csv` | Loaded driver binaries with paths and hashes |

Step 3: Analyze File Entries for Suspicious Programs

Open the `AssociatedFileEntries.csv` in Timeline Explorer and examine key columns:

Key columns to review:
- ProgramId          : Links file to its parent program entry
- SHA1               : Hash for threat intel lookups
- FullPath           : Original file location on disk
- FileSize           : Size of the executable
- FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp : When the Amcache entry was last updated
- Name               : File name
- Publisher           : Code signing publisher (blank = unsigned)
- BinProductVersion  : Version string from the PE header
- LinkDate           : PE compilation timestamp (useful for detecting timestomping)

Filter for suspicious indicators:

# In Timeline Explorer, apply these filters:

# 1. Find unsigned executables (potentially malicious)
Publisher column = (empty)

# 2. Find executables from suspicious paths
FullPath contains: \temp\, \appdata\, \downloads\, \public\, \programdata\

# 3. Find executables with recent timestamps during incident window
FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp between: 2026-03-15 00:00:00 and 2026-03-16 00:00:00

# 4. Find executables with suspicious compilation dates (timestomping)
LinkDate year < 2015 AND FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp year = 2026

Step 4: Correlate SHA-1 Hashes with Threat Intelligence

Extract SHA-1 hashes and check against

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