/auditing-dependency-security

name: ring:auditing-dependency-security
description: "Auditing a dependency for supply-chain risk before install (pip/npm/go/cargo): checks typosquatting, maintainer/age risk, vulnerability DBs (OSV, GHSA, Socket), and lockfile hash pinning, then emits a risk score and approve/conditional/escalate/block decision. Use when adding or updating a dependency, reviewing a dependency PR, or investigating a compromise. Skip when no new dependency is involved or it is already vetted."

Dependency Security Check

When to use

• Adding a new dependency to any project
• Running pip install, npm install, go get, or equivalent
• Auditing existing dependencies for supply-chain risk
• Reviewing a PR that adds or updates dependencies
• Investigating a potential supply-chain compromise

Skip when

• No dependencies are being added, updated, or audited
• Task involves only internal code changes with no new imports
• Dependency is already vetted and pinned in lockfile

Related

**Complementary:** ring:hardening-dockerfiles, ring:implementing-tasks

Supply-chain gate for every install command in a Lerian codebase.

Pre-Install Checks

1. Package Identity Verification

For every package, verify:
├── Typosquatting: compare against known popular packages
│   e.g., "requets" vs "requests", "rnodule" vs "module"
├── Homoglyph attacks: look-alike Unicode characters
├── Maintainer risk:
│   - Single maintainer = higher risk
│   - Account age < 6 months = flag
│   - Recent ownership transfer = CRITICAL flag
└── Package age: < 30 days = flag

2. Vulnerability Database Check

| Source | Ecosystem | What It Covers | |--------|-----------|----------------| | OSV.dev | All | Google aggregated CVEs | | GitHub Advisory Database | All | GHSA linked to CVEs | | Socket.dev | npm, pip | Supply-chain: install scripts, network access | | PyPI JSON API | pip | Metadata, maintainers, release history | | npm registry API | npm | Metadata, maintainers, install scripts | | Go vulnerability DB (vuln.go.dev) | Go | Official Go CVE database |

3. Behavioral Signals

| Signal | Risk Level | Description | |--------|-----------|-------------| | Install scripts | HIGH | `postinstall` (npm), `setup.py` subprocess | | Network access at import | CRITICAL | Package phones home on import | | File system access outside project | HIGH | Reads `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, env vars | | Obfuscated code | CRITICAL | Base64 payloads, eval(), exec() | | Native binary bundled | HIGH | Pre-compiled binaries without source |

4. Lockfile Integrity

| Ecosystem | Lockfile | Hash Requirement | |-----------|----------|-----------------| | Go | go.sum | SHA-256 native — Go handles automatically | | npm | package-lock.json | `integrity` field (SHA-512) must be present for ALL deps | | pip | requirements.txt | `--require-hashes` MUST be enforced | | Cargo | Cargo.lock | `checksum` field verification |

Risk Scoring

risk_score = weighted_sum(
  typosquatting_similarity * 25,
  maintainer_risk          * 20,
  package_age_risk         * 15,
  vulnerability_count      * 20,  # weighted by severity
  behavioral_flags         * 15,
  lockfile_integrity       * 5
)

Score thresholds:

• 0-25: LOW — proceed
• 26-50: MEDIUM — proceed with documentation
• 51-75: HIGH — escalate to Fred before installing
• 76-100: CRITICAL — block installation

Decision Matrix

| Risk Level | Action | |-----------|--------| | LOW (0-25) | ✅ Approve — document in PR | | MEDIUM (26-50) | ⚠️ Conditional — mitigations required | | HIGH (51-75) | 🚨 Escalate to Fred before installing | | CRITICAL (76-100) | ❌ Block — do not install |

Report Template

## Dependency Security Report

Package: {name} @ {version}
Ecosystem: {go|npm|pip}
Risk Score: {score}/100 — {LOW|MEDIUM|HIGH|CRITICAL}

### Verification Results

| Check | Status | Details |
|-------|--------|---------|
| Typosquatting check | PASS/FLAG | {comparison} |
| Maintainer verification | PASS/FLAG | {maintainer count, age} |
| Vulnerability scan | PASS/FLAG | {CVE count, severity} |
| Behavioral analysis | PASS/FLAG | {signals found} |
| Lockfile integrity | PASS/FAIL | {hash present/missing} |

### Decision
{APPROVED|CONDITIONAL|ESCALATE|BLOCKED}

### Required Actions (if not APPROVED)
1. {specific mitigations or alternatives}

Mitigations for MEDIUM Risk

• Pin exact version in lockfile
• Vendor the dependency (copy source into repo)
• Document why this specific package was chosen over alternatives
• Add to security monitoring (e.g., GitHub Dependabot alerts)