/security-review
Request a security expert assessment for code changes that touch child process spawning, file system access, configuration loading, or environment variable handling. Use when the Reviewer identifies security-sensitive changes in the MCP-LSP bridge.
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add ktnyt/cclsp --skill security-review -a windsurf -y
SKILL.md
security-review.SKILL.mdname: security-review
description: >-
Request a security expert assessment for code changes that touch child process
spawning, file system access, configuration loading, or environment variable
handling. Use when the Reviewer identifies security-sensitive changes in the
MCP-LSP bridge.
compatibility: Designed for Claude Code (or similar products)
metadata:
author: ktnyt
version: "1.0"
Security Review
Invoke the security-reviewer agent to assess security-sensitive changes.
When to trigger
- Child process spawning or lifecycle changes (`src/lsp-client.ts`)
- File system read/write operations (`src/file-editor.ts`, `src/file-scanner.ts`)
- Configuration file loading or parsing (`cclsp.json`, `CCLSP_CONFIG_PATH`)
- Environment variable handling
- New or modified LSP server adapter (`src/lsp/adapters/`)
- Setup wizard input handling (`src/setup.ts`)
Review checklist
1. **Command injection**: Are user-supplied values (config file paths, server commands) sanitized before being passed to `child_process` spawn? 2. **Path traversal**: Can file paths from LSP responses escape the project root? Are `file://` URIs validated before resolving? 3. **Resource exhaustion**: Are there timeouts on LSP server responses? Can a malicious LSP server cause unbounded memory growth? 4. **Config trust boundary**: Is `cclsp.json` treated as trusted input? What happens if it contains unexpected fields or types? 5. **Process cleanup**: Are child processes reliably terminated on shutdown? Can orphaned processes persist? 6. **Symlink attacks**: Does file resolution follow symlinks outside the project directory?
How to invoke
Use the `everything-claude-code:security-reviewer` agent via the Task tool:
Task(
subagent_type: "everything-claude-code:security-reviewer",
prompt: "Review the following changes for security concerns: <describe changes>"
)
Output expectations
The security reviewer should produce:
- **CRITICAL**: Must fix before merge (injection, traversal, credential leak)
- **HIGH**: Should fix before merge (missing timeouts, incomplete cleanup)
- **MEDIUM**: Fix when possible (defensive checks, hardening opportunities)
- **LOW**: Informational (best practice suggestions)
Read more
name: security-review description: >- Request a security expert assessment for code changes that touch child process spawning, file system access, configuration loading, or environment variable handling. Use when the Reviewer identifies security-sensitive changes in the MCP-LSP bridge. compatibility: Designed for Claude Code (or similar products) metadata: author: ktnyt version: "1.0"
Security Review
Invoke the security-reviewer agent to assess security-sensitive changes.
When to trigger
- Child process spawning or lifecycle changes (`src/lsp-client.ts`)
- File system read/write operations (`src/file-editor.ts`, `src/file-scanner.ts`)
- Configuration file loading or parsing (`cclsp.json`, `CCLSP_CONFIG_PATH`)
- Environment variable handling
- New or modified LSP server adapter (`src/lsp/adapters/`)
- Setup wizard input handling (`src/setup.ts`)
Review checklist
1. **Command injection**: Are user-supplied values (config file paths, server commands) sanitized before being passed to `child_process` spawn? 2. **Path traversal**: Can file paths from LSP responses escape the project root? Are `file://` URIs validated before resolving? 3. **Resource exhaustion**: Are there timeouts on LSP server responses? Can a malicious LSP server cause unbounded memory growth? 4. **Config trust boundary**: Is `cclsp.json` treated as trusted input? What happens if it contains unexpected fields or types? 5. **Process cleanup**: Are child processes reliably terminated on shutdown? Can orphaned processes persist? 6. **Symlink attacks**: Does file resolution follow symlinks outside the project directory?
How to invoke
Use the `everything-claude-code:security-reviewer` agent via the Task tool:
Task( subagent_type: "everything-claude-code:security-reviewer", prompt: "Review the following changes for security concerns: <describe changes>" )
Output expectations
The security reviewer should produce:
- **CRITICAL**: Must fix before merge (injection, traversal, credential leak)
- **HIGH**: Should fix before merge (missing timeouts, incomplete cleanup)
- **MEDIUM**: Fix when possible (defensive checks, hardening opportunities)
- **LOW**: Informational (best practice suggestions)
cclsp is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that seamlessly integrates LLM-based coding agents with Language Server Protocol (LSP) servers.
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Questions about security-review.
- Which coding agents can use security-review?
- security-review installs in Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, OpenCode and Windsurf with the skills CLI, using each agent's flag shown on this page. Flowy's auto-invocation, which fires a skill when your prompt matches, runs in Claude Code only.

