a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Drive a security investigation from a lead or hypothesis to an evidence-backed conclusion — correlate telemetry across sources, enrich with intel, reconstruct a timeline, scope impact, and reach a defensible verdict. Use for a deeper analytical investigation (beyond single-alert
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill security-investigation --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/security-investigationContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Drive a security investigation from a lead or hypothesis to an evidence-backed conclusion — correlate telemetry across sources, enrich with intel, reconstruct a timeline, scope impact, and reach a defensible verdict. Use for a deeper analytical investigation (beyond single-alert
name: security-investigation description: >- Drive a security investigation from a lead or hypothesis to an evidence-backed conclusion — correlate telemetry across sources, enrich with intel, reconstruct a timeline, scope impact, and reach a defensible verdict. Use for a deeper analytical investigation (beyond single-alert triage), e.g. an escalated or complex case.
A coherent answer to "what actually happened, how far did it go, and what does it mean" — built from correlated evidence, with a clear verdict, scope, and recommended action.
repeatable. Escalates into an investigation.
hosts, accounts) into one analytic picture.
investigation confirms an incident. Hand off to it.
1. **Frame the question** — the lead/hypothesis and what a conclusion would look like (confirmed malicious? scope? root cause?). Investigations are hypothesis-driven. 2. **Collect & correlate** — gather relevant telemetry (EDR, auth, network, app, SIEM) across the time window; correlate by entity (host, user, process, IP) into a single picture. Baseline normal to separate signal from noise. 3. **Enrich** — add intel context (`threat-intelligence:ioc-enrichment`, `threat-actor-profiling`) and asset/user criticality; reconcile aliases. 4. **Reconstruct the timeline** — normalize timestamps (UTC); order attacker/entity actions into a chronology (lean on `dfir:forensic-triage` for host/forensic depth). 5. **Scope** — pivot to find all affected entities, lateral movement, and dwell time; map observed behavior to MITRE ATT&CK. 6. **Assess & conclude** — verdict (confirmed/suspected/benign), confidence, impact/scope, root cause, and intelligence gaps. Separate fact from assessment. 7. **Act** — escalate to `dfir:incident-response` if confirmed; turn findings into detections (`detection-engineering`); document either way.
An investigation report: question · evidence (correlated, with sources) · timeline · ATT&CK mapping · scope/impact · verdict + confidence · root cause · recommended actions. Visualize timeline/link analysis with `security-diagramming`; write up with `security-reporting`.
Correlation is the core skill — a single source rarely tells the truth; pivot across entities and baseline normal before concluding. State confidence and separate fact from assessment from assumption. Know when to stop analyzing and **escalate**: once it's a confirmed incident, IR owns the response.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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