a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Establish or assess an org-wide secure-by-design program — paved roads / golden paths with secure defaults, automated guardrails, and developer enablement — so the secure way is the default, fast way. Use for engineering-org security strategy at scale (not a single system's
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Establish or assess an org-wide secure-by-design program — paved roads / golden paths with secure defaults, automated guardrails, and developer enablement — so the secure way is the default, fast way. Use for engineering-org security strategy at scale (not a single system's
name: secure-by-design-program description: >- Establish or assess an org-wide secure-by-design program — paved roads / golden paths with secure defaults, automated guardrails, and developer enablement — so the secure way is the default, fast way. Use for engineering-org security strategy at scale (not a single system's design).
A program that makes security the path of least resistance across the engineering org: secure defaults built into platforms and templates, guardrails that prevent classes of issues automatically, and developers enabled to build securely without friction.
1. **Paved roads / golden paths** — blessed, secure-by-default templates, platforms, and libraries (service scaffolds, hardened base images, IaC modules, auth/secrets handled for you). Make the secure choice the easy default. 2. **Guardrails (automated)** — policy-as-code and platform controls that prevent or catch whole classes of issues: CI/CD gates (`security-engineer:secure-pipeline`), admission control (`k8s-security`), org-wide cloud guardrails (`cloud-security`), secure defaults that are hard to turn off. 3. **Developer enablement** — security champions program, self-service security tooling, just-in-time guidance, threat-modeling-as-a-habit (`threat-modeling`), and training that targets the org's real defect patterns. 4. **Shift-left integration** — security built into the SDLC and developer workflow, not bolted on; fast, actionable feedback in the tools devs already use. 5. **Measurement** — adoption of paved roads, guardrail coverage, escaped-defect and mean-time-to-remediate trends; measure the program by outcomes, not policies.
1. Assess the current state: where security is friction vs. default; common defect classes; existing platforms/templates. 2. Design paved roads and guardrails that eliminate the top defect classes by default. 3. Plan enablement (champions, self-service, training) and shift-left integration. 4. Define adoption/outcome metrics and a phased rollout.
A secure-by-design program plan: paved roads · guardrails · enablement · integration · metrics · phased rollout. Use `security-reporting`; diagram the target developer/ platform flow with `security-diagramming`.
Make security the default, not a gate to argue with — friction that developers route around isn't security. Eliminate whole **classes** of issues via paved roads and guardrails rather than finding them one by one. Measure adoption and escaped defects, not the existence of a policy.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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