a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Detect hardcoded secrets, cloud keys (AWS/GCP/Azure), tokens, .env files, and sensitive config before they're committed or pushed, and verify .gitignore covers the patterns that must never be tracked. Use when the user is about to commit/push, asks "did I leak a secret", "check
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill secret-guard -a windsurf -y
name: secret-guard description: Detect hardcoded secrets, cloud keys (AWS/GCP/Azure), tokens, .env files, and sensitive config before they're committed or pushed, and verify .gitignore covers the patterns that must never be tracked. Use when the user is about to commit/push, asks "did I leak a secret", "check for hardcoded keys", "is my .gitignore missing anything", or when reviewing any diff that touches config/env files. This is the manual/interactive counterpart to the enforced git hooks this plugin installs — see README "Enforcement" section.
Catch secrets and sensitive files before they reach git history — hardcoded or in `.env`/config files — and make sure `.gitignore` actually excludes the categories of file that should never be tracked. Enforcement (blocking) happens via the installed git hooks (`scripts/install-git-hooks.sh`) and the Claude Code `PreToolUse` hook in `hooks/hooks.json`; this skill is for the interactive/manual pass, e.g. reviewing a diff before the user commits, or auditing an existing repo.
1. Scope: staged changes (`git diff --cached`) by default, or the path the user names, or a full-repo audit (including history) if the user asks for that explicitly. 2. Secret detection, in order of preference:
`key=`/`token=`/`secret=` assignments, PEM private key headers) — never skip the check for lack of a tool. 3. File-pattern check: flag any staged/tracked file matching the sensitive-file list in `reference.md` (`.env*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `id_rsa*`, `credentials.json`, `.aws/credentials`, `*.pfx`, `secrets.yml`, etc.) regardless of content — these files should not be tracked at all, secret-looking content or not. 4. `.gitignore` check: read the repo's `.gitignore` (root and any per-package ones) and diff it against the required-patterns list in `rules/gitignore-required.txt` (relative to `$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`). Report any missing pattern. 5. If a real secret or a sensitive file is already committed (not just staged), say so explicitly and note it needs history rewrite + rotation, not just a new commit (removing it in a new commit does not remove it from git history).
SECRETS FOUND: <count> [<severity>] <file>:<line> — <what matched> (<detector: gitleaks|detect-secrets|pattern>) → Remediation: remove from source, load from env/secret manager, ROTATE the credential. SENSITIVE FILES TRACKED: <count> <file> — matches sensitive-file pattern, must not be tracked. → Remediation: `git rm --cached <file>`, add pattern to .gitignore. .GITIGNORE GAPS: <count> Missing: <pattern> (<why it matters>)
If nothing found, say so plainly — don't pad a clean result with caveats.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
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