a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Assess the network protocols and services in use for security weaknesses — cleartext protocols, weak/outdated crypto and TLS, insecure or legacy services, and man-in-the-middle exposure. Use to review what's running on the network and how securely it communicates.
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill protocol-security-review --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/protocol-security-reviewContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Assess the network protocols and services in use for security weaknesses — cleartext protocols, weak/outdated crypto and TLS, insecure or legacy services, and man-in-the-middle exposure. Use to review what's running on the network and how securely it communicates.
name: protocol-security-review description: >- Assess the network protocols and services in use for security weaknesses — cleartext protocols, weak/outdated crypto and TLS, insecure or legacy services, and man-in-the-middle exposure. Use to review what's running on the network and how securely it communicates.
A view of where network communications and services are weak — unencrypted, weakly encrypted, or inherently insecure — with concrete upgrades.
1. **Cleartext protocols** — Telnet, FTP, HTTP, SNMPv1/2c, unencrypted LDAP/POP3/ IMAP/SMTP, rsh — anything carrying credentials or data in the clear. 2. **TLS/crypto quality** — protocol versions (no SSLv3/TLS1.0/1.1), weak ciphers, expired/self-signed/mismatched certs, weak key exchange, missing forward secrecy. 3. **Insecure/legacy services** — SMBv1, weak NTLM, LLMNR/NBT-NS, deprecated services that should be disabled; default credentials/community strings. 4. **MITM exposure** — name-resolution poisoning (LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS), missing SMB signing, lack of network auth (802.1X), rogue-device risk. 5. **Service exposure** — sensitive services reachable from untrusted zones (cross-ref `network-segmentation-review`).
1. Inventory services/protocols in scope (from `network-pentest` enumeration or config review). 2. Assess each against the checks above; capture protocol, weakness, and exposure. 3. Recommend the secure replacement (e.g. SSH for Telnet, SNMPv3, TLS1.2+/1.3, disable SMBv1, enable signing, deploy 802.1X) and where to enforce it.
A table: service/protocol · weakness · exposure · severity · secure replacement. Confirmed issues → `security-reporting:finding`.
Cleartext credentials on the wire and name-resolution poisoning (LLMNR/NBT-NS) are classic, high-impact, and common — prioritize them. Disabling legacy protocols (SMBv1, SSLv3/TLS1.0) is usually a high-value, low-friction win.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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