a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Map a target organization's external footprint and attack surface from public sources — domains, subdomains, IP ranges, exposed services, technologies, and organizational details. Use at the start of an engagement (or for attack-surface management) to see what an attacker sees.
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill osint-footprinting --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/osint-footprintingContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Map a target organization's external footprint and attack surface from public sources — domains, subdomains, IP ranges, exposed services, technologies, and organizational details. Use at the start of an engagement (or for attack-surface management) to see what an attacker sees.
name: osint-footprinting description: >- Map a target organization's external footprint and attack surface from public sources — domains, subdomains, IP ranges, exposed services, technologies, and organizational details. Use at the start of an engagement (or for attack-surface management) to see what an attacker sees. Authorized scope, public sources.
A structured, organized map of the target's internet-facing attack surface, built from public/passive sources, ready to drive testing or defensive remediation.
1. **Domains & subdomains** — root domains, subdomains (passive DNS, CT logs), related/typosquat domains. 2. **IP space & hosting** — IP ranges, ASNs, cloud footprint, CDNs. 3. **Exposed services** — internet-reachable hosts/ports/services (passive sources like internet-wide scan datasets), web apps, login portals, remote access. 4. **Technologies** — stacks, frameworks, third-party services, email/DNS records (SPF/DMARC/MX). 5. **Organizational context** — business units, acquisitions, brands (each expands the surface), code repos and public assets.
1. Confirm scope (which org/domains are authorized) — stay within it. 2. Collect from public/passive sources; avoid active scanning here (hand live hosts to `network-security:network-pentest` if/when authorized). 3. Organize by asset, deduplicate, and flag the most exposed/sensitive (admin portals, remote access, forgotten/legacy assets, dev/staging exposed to internet). 4. Map it — an attack-surface mindmap (`security-diagramming:mindmap`).
An attack-surface inventory: asset · type · service/tech · exposure · source · notes, plus a prioritized list of where to test (offense) or remediate (defense). Feed exposures to `exposure-discovery` and live hosts to `network-security`.
Footprinting is passive and public-source — it shows the attacker's outside view. Forgotten/legacy and dev/staging assets exposed to the internet are the highest-value finds. Acquisitions and alternate brands quietly expand the surface — enumerate them. Stay within the authorized scope even though sources are public.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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