a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Review a multimodal AI application's input handling and trust boundaries across every modality it accepts (image, audio, video, document), covering injection, unsafe parsing, provenance, and output handling. Use when assessing the security of a vision/audio/document-accepting
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill multimodal-security-review --agent claude-codeHow it fires
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/multimodal-security-reviewContext preview
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Review a multimodal AI application's input handling and trust boundaries across every modality it accepts (image, audio, video, document), covering injection, unsafe parsing, provenance, and output handling. Use when assessing the security of a vision/audio/document-accepting
name: multimodal-security-review description: >- Review a multimodal AI application's input handling and trust boundaries across every modality it accepts (image, audio, video, document), covering injection, unsafe parsing, provenance, and output handling. Use when assessing the security of a vision/audio/document-accepting feature.
A structured review of how a multimodal app ingests and trusts non-text input, identifying where untrusted media can influence behavior and where parsing/handling is unsafe.
1. **Input channels** — enumerate every accepted modality and its processing path (OCR, vision model, captioning, transcription, file parser, embedding). 2. **Trust treatment** — is content extracted from media treated as untrusted **data**, or can it act as instructions? (The central multimodal risk.) 3. **Parser safety** — format/size validation, sandboxing, decompression/entity limits, auto-fetch of embedded URLs (SSRF), timeouts. 4. **Provenance & moderation** — is media source tracked; does safety/moderation run on extracted content and on the raw media? 5. **Output handling** — where do generations and any extracted data flow downstream (see `llm-security` LLM05). 6. **Privacy** — sensitive content in images/docs (PII, faces, IDs); retention.
1. Map channels and processing (ask for the design if not provided). 2. Walk each dimension; substantiate injection/parsing claims with `multimodal-injection-test` rather than asserting. 3. Identify where any modality bypasses the text input controls. 4. Rank (`threat-modeling:risk-rank`) and map mitigations.
A dimension-by-dimension findings table + ranked top risks. Confirmed issues → `security-reporting:finding`.
Non-text channels are the commonly-forgotten input surface — they often skip the sanitization and instruction/data separation that text inputs get. Verify the same controls apply to every modality.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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