a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Review and harden Kubernetes workloads (pods/Deployments) against Pod Security Standards — privileged containers, host namespaces, hostPath, capabilities, securityContext, and admission enforcement. Use to assess or fix pod-level security for a workload or namespace.
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-workload-hardening --agent claude-codeHow it fires
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Review and harden Kubernetes workloads (pods/Deployments) against Pod Security Standards — privileged containers, host namespaces, hostPath, capabilities, securityContext, and admission enforcement. Use to assess or fix pod-level security for a workload or namespace.
name: k8s-workload-hardening description: >- Review and harden Kubernetes workloads (pods/Deployments) against Pod Security Standards — privileged containers, host namespaces, hostPath, capabilities, securityContext, and admission enforcement. Use to assess or fix pod-level security for a workload or namespace.
Workloads that meet the Pod Security Standards (baseline → restricted), with dangerous settings removed and enforcement guaranteed by admission, not just policy on paper.
1. **Privilege** — no `privileged: true`; `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`; `runAsNonRoot: true`, non-zero `runAsUser`. 2. **Host access** — no `hostNetwork`/`hostPID`/`hostIPC`; no `hostPath` mounts; no host ports. 3. **Capabilities** — `drop: ["ALL"]`, add back only what's required; no `SYS_ADMIN`/ `NET_ADMIN` unless justified. 4. **Filesystem** — `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`; writable paths via emptyDir/ volumes. 5. **Seccomp / AppArmor** — `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault` (or stricter); AppArmor where available. 6. **Resources & images** — set requests/limits (DoS containment); pinned image digests from trusted registries; non-root images; scanned (`sast-sca`). 7. **Enforcement** — Pod Security Admission level (baseline/restricted) per namespace, or a policy engine (Kyverno/OPA) so violations are rejected, not just flagged.
1. Pull the workload manifests / running pod specs in scope. 2. Compare against the restricted Pod Security Standard; flag each gap with severity. 3. Verify admission actually enforces the standard (test that a bad pod is rejected), not just that good pods exist. 4. Provide the corrected securityContext/manifest snippets.
A hardening table: workload · setting · current · required · severity · fix, plus corrected manifest snippets and the namespace admission level to enforce. Confirmed issues → `security-reporting:finding`.
A privileged or hostPath-mounted container is a node-takeover and often cluster-admin path — treat those as the top severities. Hardening the pod is only durable if **admission enforces** the standard; verify enforcement, don't assume it.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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