a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Test a web app for injection flaws — SQL/NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection, and cross-site scripting (XSS). Use to validate OWASP A03 on an authorized target by probing where untrusted input reaches an interpreter or sink.
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill injection-test --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/injection-testContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Test a web app for injection flaws — SQL/NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection, and cross-site scripting (XSS). Use to validate OWASP A03 on an authorized target by probing where untrusted input reaches an interpreter or sink.
name: injection-test description: >- Test a web app for injection flaws — SQL/NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection, and cross-site scripting (XSS). Use to validate OWASP A03 on an authorized target by probing where untrusted input reaches an interpreter or sink.
Evidence on whether untrusted input can break out of data context into an interpreter (DB, shell, template, browser DOM) — with reproducible, non-destructive proof.
tables or run harmful commands).
1. **SQL / NoSQL injection** — error-based, boolean/time-based blind; check ORDER BY, auth bypass, JSON/operator injection for NoSQL. 2. **Cross-site scripting (XSS)** — reflected, stored, DOM-based; test HTML, attr, JS, and URL contexts; check the CSP. 3. **OS command injection** — input reaching shell calls; blind via timing/OOB. 4. **Template injection (SSTI)** — input rendered by a server-side template engine. 5. **LDAP / header / other interpreter injection** as applicable.
1. Enumerate input → sink paths (params, headers, JSON, file names, stored fields). 2. Probe each with safe marker payloads; confirm the interpreter is reached (reflection, error, timing, OOB callback). Use non-destructive proofs. 3. Determine context to craft a minimal working PoC (e.g. the encoding XSS needs). 4. Record: class · location · context · PoC · evidence · impact.
A results table: class · parameter/sink · context · PoC · evidence · remediation (parameterized queries, context-aware output encoding, allow-list validation, safe templating/sandboxing, CSP). Confirmed issues → `security-reporting:finding`.
Fixes are sink-specific: parameterize for SQL, encode-per-context for XSS, avoid shell for commands, sandbox templates. Input validation alone is not a reliable fix — pair it with safe output/interpreter handling. Keep all payloads benign.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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