a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Write up a single security finding in a consistent, actionable format: title, severity (CVSS), affected assets, evidence, impact, reproduction, and remediation. Use whenever you've identified one issue and need it documented for a report or ticket.
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill finding --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/findingContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Write up a single security finding in a consistent, actionable format: title, severity (CVSS), affected assets, evidence, impact, reproduction, and remediation. Use whenever you've identified one issue and need it documented for a report or ticket.
name: finding description: >- Write up a single security finding in a consistent, actionable format: title, severity (CVSS), affected assets, evidence, impact, reproduction, and remediation. Use whenever you've identified one issue and need it documented for a report or ticket.
One self-contained, defensible finding that an engineer can act on and a reviewer can verify.
## <ID> — <concise title> - Severity: <Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info> (CVSS 4.0: <score> <vector>) - Affected: <assets / endpoints / components> - Status: Open ### Summary One or two sentences: what the issue is and why it matters. ### Evidence Request/response, code excerpt, screenshot ref, log line, or command output. Redact secrets. Make it reproducible. For code-backed findings, show the vulnerable snippet here (`file:line` + fenced code) and put the corrected version under Remediation as a matching fenced snippet — a before/after pair. ### Impact What an attacker achieves; tie to confidentiality/integrity/availability and to business consequence. ### Reproduction Numbered, minimal steps to observe the issue. ### Remediation Specific, testable fix(es) — for code issues, a fixed code snippet matching the vulnerable one in Evidence. Prefer the durable root-cause fix; note interim mitigations. Link references (OWASP/CWE/vendor docs). ### References CWE-XXX, OWASP item, advisories.
1. Confirm severity via `/security-reporting:cvss` (don't eyeball it). 2. Map to a **CWE** and the relevant framework item (OWASP Top 10 / API / LLM, ATT&CK technique) — improves triage and dedup. 3. Ensure evidence is reproducible and secrets are redacted. 4. Write remediation that is specific enough to be tested as "fixed".
The finding in the structure above (Markdown). Keep one finding per issue so it can be ticketed independently and rolled into `pentest-report`.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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