a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Operationalize a safety/prompt-injection eval suite into an enforced CI gate — not just a one-off report — using the ready-to-copy promptfoo/garak template, a regression baseline, and a burn-in rollout. Use when a safety eval already exists (or is being designed) and needs to
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill evals-ci-gate -a windsurf -y
name: evals-ci-gate description: >- Operationalize a safety/prompt-injection eval suite into an enforced CI gate — not just a one-off report — using the ready-to-copy promptfoo/garak template, a regression baseline, and a burn-in rollout. Use when a safety eval already exists (or is being designed) and needs to actually block regressions on every release rather than being run manually once.
A working, tuned CI gate that fails releases on a real safety/injection regression — durable and enforced, not a stale one-time eval someone read once.
1. **Pull in the test material.** Eval set, harm categories, and rubrics come from `ai-safety:safety-evaluation`; the prompt-injection payload taxonomy for the injection-resistance cases comes from `llm-security:prompt-injection-test`. This skill doesn't design the tests — it makes them an enforced gate. 2. **Install the gate.** Copy `templates/genai-eval-gates/` into the target repo (`promptfoo.config.yaml` + `.github/workflows/genai-eval-gate.yml`). Point the config's `providers` section at the real model/endpoint and replace the illustrative test cases with the real eval set from step 1. 3. **Establish the regression baseline.** Run the suite once, review results by hand, fix any ambiguous/poorly-worded rubrics, then commit the run as `eval-baseline.json` — every future run is compared against this, not against an absolute pass-rate target (LLM outputs have natural run-to-run variance). 4. **Roll out in report-only mode first**, then flip to blocking, per the burn-in stages in `templates/genai-eval-gates/EVAL-GATE-NOTES.md` — do not make this a required check on day one. 5. **Wire the decision, not just the number.** Point `ai-safety-engineer:safety-case` at this gate's *live* pass rate as ongoing evidence for its safety argument, instead of citing a stale one-time eval run.
A short description of the installed gate: what it blocks on (regression vs. baseline, tolerance used), the current baseline's date/version, and which rollout stage it's at (report-only / tightening / blocking).
This is the operationalization step, not the test design — that lives in `ai-safety:safety-evaluation` and `ai-safety:safety-red-team`. A gate that's green because the eval set or baseline has gone stale is worse than an honest red; keep the eval set versioned and revisit the baseline whenever the model, prompt, or eval set changes meaningfully.
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