a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Translate technical security risk into business and financial terms — top risk scenarios, likelihood × impact, a risk register, and (where useful) quantified loss ranges (FAIR-aware) — to support executive decisions on treat/transfer/accept. Use to communicate or prioritize
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill cyber-risk-quantification --agent claude-codeHow it fires
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/cyber-risk-quantificationContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Translate technical security risk into business and financial terms — top risk scenarios, likelihood × impact, a risk register, and (where useful) quantified loss ranges (FAIR-aware) — to support executive decisions on treat/transfer/accept. Use to communicate or prioritize
name: cyber-risk-quantification description: >- Translate technical security risk into business and financial terms — top risk scenarios, likelihood × impact, a risk register, and (where useful) quantified loss ranges (FAIR-aware) — to support executive decisions on treat/transfer/accept. Use to communicate or prioritize cyber risk for leadership.
Cyber risk expressed the way executives make decisions: which scenarios matter, what they could cost the business, how that compares to risk appetite, and what to do (treat / transfer / accept).
1. **Identify risk scenarios** — concrete, business-relevant loss events (e.g. "ransomware halts operations for N days", "breach of customer PII") rather than raw vulnerabilities. Derive from `threat-modeling`, findings, and threat intel. 2. **Estimate likelihood and impact** — qualitative (heat map: likelihood × impact) and, where the decision warrants, quantitative loss ranges (a FAIR-style estimate: frequency × magnitude, expressed as a range, not false precision). 3. **Compare to appetite** — plot residual risk against the org's stated risk appetite/tolerance; flag what exceeds it. 4. **Recommend treatment** — for each significant risk: mitigate (and the control + cost), transfer (insurance/contract), or accept (with owner and sign-off). 5. **Maintain the register** — owner, current vs. residual risk, treatment, status, review date; track trend over time.
A risk register + a heat map, plus quantified top risks (loss ranges) where relevant, and treatment recommendations. Use `security-reporting`; visualize the heat map with `security-diagramming:infographic`. Feeds `security-strategy` and `board-deck`.
Quantify in ranges, not false precision — "likely $2–8M annual loss exposure" beats a single fabricated number. Frame risks as business loss scenarios, not CVEs. Tie every significant risk to an explicit treatment decision and an accountable owner; accepted risk must be consciously accepted, not defaulted.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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