a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Plan and run an objectives-based adversary-emulation engagement: select a relevant threat actor, build an ATT&CK-mapped emulation plan across the attack lifecycle, execute within rules of engagement, and assess detection/response. Use for full-scope red-team work. Strictly
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill adversary-emulation --agent claude-codeHow it fires
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Plan and run an objectives-based adversary-emulation engagement: select a relevant threat actor, build an ATT&CK-mapped emulation plan across the attack lifecycle, execute within rules of engagement, and assess detection/response. Use for full-scope red-team work. Strictly
name: adversary-emulation description: >- Plan and run an objectives-based adversary-emulation engagement: select a relevant threat actor, build an ATT&CK-mapped emulation plan across the attack lifecycle, execute within rules of engagement, and assess detection/response. Use for full-scope red-team work. Strictly authorized engagements only.
A realistic, objectives-based engagement that emulates a chosen adversary's TTPs to reach a defined objective — producing both offensive findings and an honest measure of the blue team's detection and response.
permitted techniques, off-limits systems/data, deconfliction contacts, and the win condition (the "flag"/objective). Stay within them at all times.
1. **Select the adversary & objective** — pick a threat actor relevant to the org (`threat-intelligence:threat-actor-profiling`) and define the objective (e.g. "access crown-jewel data X"). Realism comes from emulating a real actor's TTPs. 2. **Build the emulation plan** — map the engagement across the attack lifecycle (recon → initial access → execution → persistence → privilege escalation → defense evasion → credential access → discovery → lateral movement → collection → C2 → exfiltration/impact), choosing ATT&CK techniques the actor actually uses. 3. **Recon** — `osint` (footprinting, exposure, people) to find a realistic entry. 4. **Execute within RoE** — work the plan; on network use `network-security`. Operate with appropriate stealth where authorized, but never outside scope and never destructively. Log every action with timestamps for deconfliction. 5. **Track detection** — record, per technique, whether it generated telemetry, fired a detection, and prompted response (this is the core value vs. a pentest). 6. **Assess & debrief** — did you reach the objective? Which TTPs were detected vs. missed? Where are the gaps?
An engagement report: objective & outcome · adversary emulated · ATT&CK technique timeline (executed vs. detected vs. responded) · attack path (`security-diagramming:attack-tree`) · findings · detection/response gaps · recommendations. Use `security-reporting`. Feed gaps to `detection-engineering` and run a `blue-team:purple-team-exercise` to close them.
Red teaming measures **outcomes and detection**, not vulnerability count — the deliverable is "could a realistic adversary achieve X, and would we have caught them?" Stay rigorously within RoE: authorized, non-destructive, deconflicted, and logged. The highest value is collaborative (purple) — emulate, measure, then help the defenders close the gaps.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
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