/electron-dev

name: electron-dev
description: Electron desktop apps with React, TypeScript, and Vite. Use for IPC, window/tray, PTY terminals, WebRTC, and packaging.

Electron desktop development

Patterns and practices for building production-quality Electron applications with React and TypeScript.

Security baseline (Electron 30+)

Electron's defaults have hardened over the past several releases. As of Electron 28+, `contextIsolation: true` and `sandbox: true` are the defaults for new BrowserWindow instances, most security advice from older guides assumed you had to opt in. You don't anymore; you have to opt OUT, and you should not.

Set explicitly anyway, so a config drift never weakens the security model:

const win = new BrowserWindow({
  webPreferences: {
    contextIsolation: true,        // default since 12, mandatory for any prod app
    sandbox: true,                  // default since 28; renderer runs sandboxed
    nodeIntegration: false,         // never enable in renderer
    webSecurity: true,              // never disable
    preload: path.join(__dirname, 'preload.cjs')
  }
});

Validate every IPC message in main. Don't trust the renderer.

Electron Fuses + ASAR integrity

Electron Fuses are package-time toggles baked into the binary. The two relevant for security distribution:

• `EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation`, verifies the app.asar hash at runtime against a hash embedded in the binary. Defends against attackers swapping the asar contents post-install.
• `OnlyLoadAppFromAsar`, refuses to load app code from anywhere except the validated asar.

These are **opt-in**, not default. Enable both for production. Requires `@electron/asar` 3.1.0+ to generate the asar with embeddable integrity. electron-builder configures this via `electronFuses` in the build config; `@electron/fuses` does it programmatically.

CVE-2023-44402 (ASAR integrity bypass via filetype confusion) was the canonical motivation here, without integrity + only-load-from-asar, an attacker who can modify app files can swap behavior silently.

Common renderer-side risks

• **Preload script confusion**, only expose narrow, typed surfaces via `contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld`. Never re-export `ipcRenderer` itself; expose specific methods that map to specific channels.
• **`file://` IPC and navigation**, restrict navigation with `webContents.on('will-navigate', e => e.preventDefault())` for windows that shouldn't change URL. Deny `setWindowOpenHandler` requests by default; allow-list specific origins.
• **`shell.openExternal` with user input**, validate the URL scheme before opening. An attacker-controlled `file://` or `javascript:` URL hands them code execution.

Architecture patterns

Project structure

app/
├── electron/
│   ├── main.cjs              # Main process (CommonJS required)
│   ├── preload.cjs           # Context bridge for secure IPC
│   └── server.cjs            # Optional: WebSocket/HTTP server
├── src/
│   ├── components/           # React components
│   ├── services/             # Business logic (API clients, Firebase)
│   ├── utils/                # Utilities (audio, formatting)
│   ├── types.ts              # TypeScript interfaces
│   ├── App.tsx               # Root component
│   └── index.tsx             # React entry
├── assets/                   # Icons, sounds, images
├── package.json
├── vite.config.ts
└── electron-builder.yml      # Build configuration

IPC communication pattern

**Main process (main.cjs):**

const { ipcMain } = require('electron');

// Handle async requests from renderer
ipcMain.handle('action-name', async (event, args) => {
  try {
    const result = await someAsyncOperation(args);
    return { success: true, data: result };
  } catch (error) {
    return { success: false, error: error.message };
  }
});

// Send data to renderer
mainWindow.webContents.send('event-name', data);

**Preload script (preload.cjs):**

const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require('electron');

contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electron', {
  actionName: (args) => ipcRenderer.invoke('action-name', args),
  onEventName: (callback) => {
    const handler = (event, data) => callback(data);
    ipcRenderer.on('event-name', handler);
    return () => ipcRenderer.removeListener('event-name', handler);
  }
});

**Renderer (React):**

const result = await window.electron.actionName(args);

useEffect(() => {
  return window.electron.onEventName((data) => {
    setState(data);
  });
}, []);

System tray integration

const { Tray, Menu, nativeImage } = require('electron');

let tray = null;

function createTray() {
  const icon = nativeImage.createFromPath(path.join(__dirname, '../assets/tray-icon.png'));
  tray = new Tray(icon.resize({ width: 16, height: 16 }));

  tray.setToolTip('App Name');
  tray.setContextMenu(Menu.buildFromTemplate([
    { label: 'Show', click: () => mainWindow.show() },
    { label: 'Quit', click: () => app.quit() }
  ]));

  tray.on('click', () => {
    mainWindow.isVisible() ? mainWindow.hide() : mainWindow.show();
  });
}

// Hide to tray instead of closing
mainWindow.on('close', (event) => {
  if (!app.isQuitting) {
    event.preventDefault();
    mainWindow.hide();
  }
});

Global shortcuts

const { globalShortcut } = require('electron');

app.whenReady().then(() => {
  // Register with conflict detection
  const registered = globalShortcut.register('Alt+S', () => {
    mainWindow.webContents.send('shortcut-triggered', 'toggle-recording');
  });

  if (!registered) {
    console.error('Shortcut registration failed - conflict detected');
  }
});

app.on('will-quit', () => {
  globalShortcut.unregisterAll();
});

PTY terminal integration (node-pty)

const pty = require('node-pty');

const shell = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'powershell.exe' : process.env.SHELL || '/bin/bash';

const ptyProcess = pty.spawn(shell, [],