/review-security

name: review-security
user-invocable: false
version: 4.10.0
author: "Gabriel Trabanco <1969593+gtrabanco@users.noreply.github.com>"
license: MIT
description: >
  Internal security review pass of the agentic-workflow review pack — composed
  in-turn by review-change and product-audit; not a menu entry. Checks secrets,
  input validation, injection, authn/authz, PII exposure, and dependency risk
  on the changed surface. Findings only; never edits code.

Review Security (internal)

Composed by `review-change` / `product-audit` within their conversation — on any agent, follow this file inline as the routed step. **Findings only; never edits, never refactors.**

Scope

The caller's diff or path/glob — the shape is the finder contract's (`skills/review-implementation/references/FINDER_CONTRACT.md`, this section's owner). State the scope at the top of the returned table.

Checklist (evaluate EVERY item — none is optional; n/a must be stated)

✓ No secrets/credentials/tokens in code, config, tests, or fixtures (grep the diff for key-like strings) ✓ Every external input on the changed paths is validated/sanitized before use ✓ No injection vectors (SQL/command/path/template) — parameterized/escaped, never concatenated ✓ AuthN/AuthZ enforced on every new/changed endpoint or entry point (cite where) ✓ No PII or secrets written to logs/error messages on the changed paths ✓ Webhooks/callbacks verify signatures before processing ✓ Rate limiting / abuse controls considered where a new public surface appears (n/a if none) ✓ New/updated dependencies pinned and free of known-critical advisories — run `bun scripts/dependency-advisory-pass.mjs` (node fallback if bun is not installed) and cite the row it prints for a dependency this change **adds or updates**: a `blocking` row is a finding, a `report-only` row is a report-note, and a pre-existing advisory on an untouched dependency is never a finding here — the baseline-advisory rule, owner `review-implementation` (`CLASSIFY.md` §Severity ladder) ✓ Error responses don't leak stack traces or internal paths ✓ Unsafe deserialization / dynamic evaluation of untrusted data absent

Materiality bar

The bar is owned by `skills/review-implementation/references/FINDER_CONTRACT.md` — apply it as written: cite the rule it violates beside the evidence; never pad the table.

Return exactly

`Sev` and `Impact` are the two published closed sets (`BLOCKER | CRITICAL | WARNING | SUGGESTION` and `blocking | docs-only | report-only`); their meanings are owned by `review-implementation` (`CLASSIFY.md` §Severity ladder) — assign a token, never a prose grade.

REVIEW SECURITY — scope: <scope>

| # | Finding | Sev | Impact | Evidence | Suggested fix |
|---|---------|-----|--------|----------|---------------|
| 1 | <what>  | BLOCKER|CRITICAL|WARNING|SUGGESTION | blocking|docs-only|report-only | <file:line> | <smallest action> |

Checklist: <n> evaluated, <n> pass, <n> findings, <n> n/a (<which + why>)
Summary: <1-2 sentences>
Decision: PASS | FAIL

FAIL if any `BLOCKER`, `CRITICAL` or `WARNING` finding is open; PASS otherwise. `SUGGESTION` findings never block — they route to the caller's triage step.

Done when

• Every checklist item was evaluated with evidence (file:line or command output)

or explicitly marked n/a with the reason.

• The fixed-format block above is returned — nothing more, nothing less — and

no code was changed.