/dpop-adoption

name: dpop-adoption
metadata:
  version: "1.0.1"
  category: Identity
description: >-
  Implement and debug OAuth 2.0 DPoP (RFC 9449) refresh token sender-constraining
  for WebCrypto, Node.js ES6, and browser runtimes integrating with Google's OAuth
  platform. Use when configuring non-extractable asymmetric key pairs (P-256),
  generating DPoP Proof JWTs for authorization code exchange and token refresh, or
  handling 400 use_dpop_nonce challenge retry loops at oauth2.googleapis.com/token.
  Don't use for unconstrained OAuth 2.0 flows (where refresh tokens are not bound
  to a client key pair), or for Google Cloud IAM / service account authentication.

DPoP Adoption & Identity Security Architecture

Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession (DPoP, RFC 9449) secures OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens against interception and replay attacks by cryptographically binding them to a private key held exclusively by the client. In Google's OAuth 2.0 platform, DPoP binds the refresh token at the token endpoint, while access tokens issued for Google APIs are standard Bearer tokens (`token_type: "Bearer"`).

1. Core Cryptographic & Architectural Invariants

When implementing DPoP helpers or upgrading HTTP clients, you MUST adhere to the following strict security invariants:

A. Universal WebCrypto & Runtime Compatibility

• In modern ES6 JavaScript (`"type": "module"` for Node 18+ and browsers),

ALWAYS access `globalThis.crypto` directly after verifying the environment context.

• **NEVER** import legacy CommonJS modules via `require('node:crypto')` or

reference browser-scoped `window.crypto`, as these cause module initialization crashes across hybrid runtimes.

B. Hardware-Backed Non-Extractable Key Persistence

• Generate an Elliptic Curve key pair on the SECP256R1 (`P-256`) curve: `{

name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }`.

• **CRITICAL SECURITY GUARDRAIL:** The private key MUST be configured as

**non-extractable** (`extractable: false`). This guarantees the private key can never leave the platform's cryptographic boundary (Secure Enclave, Android KeyStore, or JS sandbox memory), thwarting XSS and dependency token theft attacks.

• **Runtime Persistence Scope:** In-memory WebCrypto (`extractable: false`)

key generation applies to browser/IndexedDB contexts and single-process runtime harnesses; multi-instance or persistent server-side Node.js deployments should bind DPoP private keys via KMS/HSM/TPM so bound refresh tokens survive process restarts.

• The public key MUST remain exportable (`extractable: true`) to allow

emitting JSON Web Keys (JWKs).

C. Public JWK Formatting Standards

• When exporting public keys to attach to DPoP Proof JWT headers, construct a

clean JWK dictionary containing strictly:

• `"kty": "EC"`
• `"crv": "P-256"`
• `"x"`: Base64URL-encoded x-coordinate without trailing equal sign

padding (`=`).

• `"y"`: Base64URL-encoded y-coordinate without trailing equal sign

padding (`=`).

• **NEVER** expose private key parameters (`"d"`) or superfluous metadata.

D. IEEE P1363 vs. ASN.1 DER Signature Disambiguation

• DPoP Proof JWTs require raw concatenated coordinate signatures ($R \parallel

S$, exactly 64 bytes for P-256) per IEEE P1363 and RFC 7518.

• **WebCrypto Native Rule:** In standard WebCrypto (`crypto.subtle.sign`),

ECDSA signatures are ALREADY emitted natively in raw IEEE P1363 format (concatenated 32-byte `r` and `s` buffers, 64 bytes total). **DO NOT** attempt DER-to-Raw conversion on `crypto.subtle.sign` outputs, as parsing a 64-byte raw buffer as ASN.1 DER causes an immediate runtime exception (`Invalid DER sequence`). Directly base64url-encode the raw ArrayBuffer.

• **Legacy API Fallback:** If and only if implementing in legacy Java/Android

(`java.security.Signature`) or Node CommonJS (`crypto.createSign`), convert ASN.1 DER output to raw 64-byte IEEE P1363 format before base64url encoding.

E. SPA & Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) Architecture

• **Secretless SPAs Limitation:** Pure client-side single-page applications

(SPAs) without a backend cannot use DPoP directly with Google APIs due to `client_secret` requirements on server endpoints and browser CORS limitations on the `DPoP-Nonce` response header.

• **BFF Pattern:** To secure SPAs with DPoP, route authorization and token

refresh requests through a Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) server-side client. The BFF sets `access_type=offline`, binds refresh tokens server-side using DPoP, and maintains secure session cookies with the frontend.

2. Implementation Rules & Mandatory Public API

When creating new modules, your module MUST explicitly export all functions below to integrate cleanly with CI/CD verification harnesses and automated probers. When inspecting or refactoring existing codebases, ensure equivalent cryptographic and RFC 9449 logic is present. Obey strict claim derivation logic in all cases:

A. DPoP Proof JWT Claim Derivation Rules (`createDPoPProof`)

When generating the DPoP Proof JWT in `createDPoPProof`:

**1. JOSE Header (`typ`, `alg`, `jwk`):**

// Header
{
  "typ": "dpop+jwt",
  "alg": "ES256",
  "jwk": await exportPublicJWK(publicKey)
}

**2. Payload Claims:**

• `"htm"`: Uppercase HTTP Method (`"POST"` for token requests).
• `"htu"`: Target URI stripped of query parameters and hash fragments using

`sanitizeHTU(htu)`. For token requests, this is `https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token`.

• `"iat"`: Current integer epoch timestamp in seconds

(`Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)`).

• `"jti"` (Critical Invariant):

1. If an explicit `jti` argument is provided to `createDPoPProof`, use that exact string over all others. 2. Otherwise, if an `authCode` argument is provided (during initial code exchange), set `jti = await calculateAuthCodeJti(authCode)` where