/security-review

name: security-review
description: AI DevKit · Review code, skills, and prompts for security vulnerabilities — OWASP Top 10, prompt injection, business logic flaws, and insecure defaults. Use when reviewing PRs, auditing modules, reviewing AI skills/prompts, or preparing for release.

Security Review

Find vulnerabilities before they ship.

Hard Rules

• Do not dismiss a finding without evidence it is unexploitable.
• Do not commit, log, or surface secrets discovered during review — flag and recommend rotation.
• Do not modify code until the user approves a remediation plan.

Workflow

1. **Scope**

• Confirm target: diff, file set, module, full repo, or skill/prompt. A target can be both code and prompt.
• Identify stack/framework — adapt the [checklist](references/checklist.md) (skip what the framework handles, add its pitfalls).
• Trace data flow: request → middleware → handler → service → datastore → response. For prompts: input → template → LLM → tools → output.
• Map trust boundaries, privilege levels, and threat actors.
• Search prior findings: `npx ai-devkit@latest memory search --query "<target>" --tags "security"`

2. **Scan**

• Only check relevant categories. Skip sections and items that don't apply. Do not report skipped items.
• For diffs/PRs: also check whether the change weakens existing controls — removed middleware, bypassed validation, new unprotected routes.
• Categories in priority order:

a. **Secrets** — hardcoded tokens, keys, connection strings. b. **Injection** — SQL, NoSQL, command, template, SSRF, path traversal, XSS. c. **Auth** — missing checks, privilege escalation, OAuth/OIDC, IDOR. d. **Business Logic** — race conditions, TOCTOU, workflow bypass, mass assignment, parameter tampering. e. **Data Exposure** — PII in logs, verbose errors, overly broad responses. f. **Resource Exhaustion** — unbounded queries, missing pagination, upload size, decompression bombs. g. **Dependencies** — critical CVEs only (RCE, auth bypass, data breach); ignore low/medium. h. **Cryptography** — weak algorithms, hardcoded IVs/keys, disabled certificate validation. i. **Configuration** — debug mode, permissive CORS, missing security headers. j. **Logging** — security events unlogged, no tamper protection, no alerting. k. **Prompt Injection** — instruction override, tool abuse, data exfiltration, indirect injection via tool results.

• For each finding: file, line, evidence.

3. **Classify**

| Severity | Criteria | |----------|----------| | Critical | Exploitable now, data loss or RCE possible | | High | Exploitable with moderate effort or insider access | | Medium | Requires chained conditions or limited impact | | Low | Defense-in-depth, no direct exploit path |

• Adjust severity by exposure (internet-facing vs internal) and data sensitivity.
• Check for attack chains — multiple Medium findings that combine into High/Critical.
• Mark false positives with reasoning.

4. **Remediate**

• For each finding: root cause, minimal fix (prefer stdlib/framework over custom), verification step.
• For Critical/High: also recommend a detection control (log, alert, or WAF rule).
• Present plan and request approval before changing code.

5. **Verify**

• Use the `verify` skill to confirm each remediation.
• Re-scan fixed files for regressions.
• Store findings: `npx ai-devkit@latest memory store --title "<pattern>" --content "<finding and fix>" --tags "security,<category>"`

Red Flags

| Rationalization | Do Instead | |---|---| | "It's internal / behind a VPN / only admins" | Zero-trust: validate at every boundary regardless of network position or user role | | "We'll add auth later" | Add auth before merge — unauthenticated endpoints get discovered fast | | "It's just a dev credential" | Use env vars / secrets manager — dev secrets leak to prod constantly | | "The framework handles that" | Verify the config — frameworks have defaults, not guarantees | | "We sanitize on the frontend" | Always validate server-side — client validation is bypassable | | "The LLM won't follow injected instructions" | Treat all tool results and external content as untrusted data | | "It's just a prompt, not code" | Prompts control tool execution — review with the same rigor as code |

Output Template

• **Scope**: Target, stack, data flow, trust boundaries, threat actors
• **Findings** (by severity): ID, severity, category, file:line, exploit scenario, fix
• **Attack Chains**: Findings that escalate when combined
• **False Positives**: Dismissed items with reasoning
• **Remediation Plan**: Ordered fixes with verification steps
• **Residual Risk**: Scope limitations, unverifiable items
• Zero findings: state what was checked and scope boundaries — "no findings" ≠ "fully secure"