acl-abuse
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted…
SMB share enumeration, access testing, password policy extraction, and content searching. Enumerates shares via null session, guest, and authenticated access. Covers share listing, per-share access testing, MANSPIDER content search, and SMB vulnerability detection (signing,
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill smb-enumeration --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/smb-enumerationContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
SMB share enumeration, access testing, password policy extraction, and content searching. Enumerates shares via null session, guest, and authenticated access. Covers share listing, per-share access testing, MANSPIDER content search, and SMB vulnerability detection (signing,
name: smb-enumeration description: > SMB share enumeration, access testing, password policy extraction, and content searching. Enumerates shares via null session, guest, and authenticated access. Covers share listing, per-share access testing, MANSPIDER content search, and SMB vulnerability detection (signing, EternalBlue). Use after network-recon identifies SMB ports (139/445). keywords: - SMB shares - null session - guest access - smbclient - enum4linux - MANSPIDER - SMB signing - share enumeration - password policy - NetExec smb tools: - smbclient - NetExec - enum4linux-ng - MANSPIDER - nmap opsec: medium
You are helping a penetration tester enumerate SMB services on a target host. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
descriptive filenames (e.g., `smb-shares-10.10.10.5.txt`, `smb-manspider-results.txt`).
This skill covers SMB enumeration only — share listing, access testing, content searching, and vulnerability detection. When you reach the boundary of this scope, **STOP**.
Do not load or execute another skill. Return to the orchestrator with:
**Routing boundaries:**
**Stay in methodology.** Only use techniques documented in this skill.
These are handled by dedicated skills. This skill discovers and reports.
Call `get_state_summary()` to read current engagement state. Use it to:
**State writes** — write critical discoveries immediately:
**Return summary must include:**
**Run ALL of the following tools in sequence — not just one.** SMB tools use different RPC calls and authentication methods under the hood. A failure or partial result from one tool does NOT mean the others will also fail. NetExec might return `STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED` while `smbclient -L` succeeds, or vice versa. You must try every tool before concluding that SMB enumeration has failed.
# Tool 1: smbclient null session share listing smbclient -N -L //TARGET_IP/ # Tool 2: NetExec null session + guest netexec smb TARGET_IP -u '' -p '' --shares netexec smb TARGET_IP -u 'guest' -p '' --shares # Tool 3: enum4linux-ng comprehensive enumeration enum4linux-ng -A TARGET_IP
Collect all unique share names from ALL tools. A share discovered by any tool counts — even if other tools failed to list it.
netexec smb TARGET_IP -u '' -p '' --pass-pol netexec smb TARGET_IP -u 'guest' -p '' --pass-pol
If either succeeds, record the full policy. The orchestrator needs this before routing to password-spraying. Key values: lockout threshold (0 = no lockout — critical for spray decisions), observation window, lockout duration, min password length, complexity requirements.
nmap -sV -p445 --script smb-enum-shares,smb-enum-users,smb-os-discovery,smb-vuln* TARGET_IP
Check results for: SMB signing status, OS version, EternalBlue (ms17-010), SMBGhost (CVE-2020-0796), user accounts enumerated.
**This step is NOT optional.** Test every share individually with `smbclient`. Access denied on one share tells you NOTHING about other shares — Windows ACLs are per-share. Skipping a share is a methodology failure.
For EVERY share discovered in Steps 1 and 3 (from ANY tool), run:
smbclient //TARGET_IP/SHARENAME -N -c 'ls' 2>&1
If `ls` succeeds (shows files/directories), the share is readable. Follow up:
# Recursive listing of accessible share smbclient //TARGET_IP/SHARENAME -N -c 'recurse ON; prompt OFF; ls' # Download interesting files (configs, scripts, credentials, backups) smbclient //TARGET_IP/SHARENAME -N -c 'rec
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted…
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Establishes persistence and exploits weak certificate mapping in AD CS. Covers ESC9 (no security extension), ESC10 (weak certificate mapping), ESC12-15…
Exploits misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate any domain user via SAN manipulation or enrollment agent abuse. Covers ESC1 (enrollee…