acl-abuse
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted…
Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover this hash", "offline recovery", "john",
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill credential-recovery --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/credential-recoveryContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover this hash", "offline recovery", "john",
name: credential-recovery description: > Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover this hash", "offline recovery", "john", "hashcat", "zip2john", "password-protected file". Do NOT use for online password attacks (spraying, brute force against services) — use password-spraying instead. keywords: - crack - hash - hashcat - john - zip2john - office2john - keepass2john - ssh2john - ansible2john - ansible vault - rockyou - wordlist - offline - brute force - NTLM - Kerberos TGS - AS-REP - shadow - bcrypt - MSCACHE2 - PKZIP - password-protected tools: - hashcat - john - zip2john - office2john - pdf2john - keepass2john - ssh2john - 7z2john - rar2john - gpg2john - ansible2john opsec: low
You are helping a penetration tester with offline credential and file cracking. This skill covers hash identification, extraction from encrypted files, and cracking with hashcat or john. All operations are local — no target interaction. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
This skill covers offline hash cracking and encrypted file cracking only. It does NOT cover:
When cracking is complete, STOP and return to the orchestrator with cracked credentials and recommendations for where to test them.
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
Your return summary must include:
for `*2john` tools)
1. `/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt` (Kali default — may be a symlink or compressed `.gz`) 2. `/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt` (SecLists location) 3. `/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt.tar.gz` (compressed — extract first: `tar xzf rockyou.txt.tar.gz`) 4. `/opt/seclists/Passwords/` (legacy SecLists path)
**Common issue**: `/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt` is often a broken symlink pointing to `/opt/seclists/...` which doesn't exist. If the symlink is broken, check `/usr/share/seclists/` directly. If rockyou is only available as `.tar.gz`, extract to `$TMPDIR` before use.
**If rockyou.txt is not found at ANY of the above locations** (including compressed variants), STOP immediately. Do not create custom wordlists or generate passwords. Report the failure:
> [credential-cracking] STOPPED — no wordlist found. Checked: > /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt, /usr/share/seclists/Passwords/, > /opt/seclists/Passwords/. Install SecLists or provide a wordlist path.
Return to the orchestrator with this message. The operator must install a wordlist before cracking can proceed.
hashcat and john need write access to multiple locations: session files (`~/.local/share/hashcat/sessions/`), potfile (`~/.local/share/hashcat/ hashcat.potfile`), restore files (CWD), and temp working files. Redirecting each individually with `--session`, `--potfile-path`, `-o` flags is fragile and often still fails.
**Always run hashcat and john with `dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true`.** This is the only reliable approach in Claude Code's sandboxed environment.
# CORRECT — disable sandbox for all cracking commands
Bash(command="hashcat -m MODE hash.txt wordlist.txt --force",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)
Bash(command="john --wordlist=wordlist.txt hash.txt",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)
# Also for --show after cracking
Bash(command="hashcat -m MODE hash.txt --show",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)**Do not** attempt `$TMPDIR` workarounds first — go straight to sandbox disable. Cracking is a local-only operation with no security implications from disabling the sandbox.
Most `*2john` extraction tools ship with **john-jumbo**, not basic john. Check:
john --version 2>&1 | head -1 # Should show "John the Ripper" with "jumbo" in the version string
If john-jumbo is not installed:
# Debian/Ubuntu sudo apt install john # Or build from source (last resort) git clone https://github.com/openwall/john.git cd john/src && ./configure && make -s clean && make -sj$(nproc) # Binary at ../run/john
The `*2john` tools are typically in `/usr/share/john/` or alongside the john binary (e.g., `/opt/john/run/zip2john`). Check with:
find /usr -name "zip2john" 2>/dev/null find /opt -name "zip2john" 2>/dev/null
Determine what needs cracking. This come
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted…
Enumerates Active Directory domains and maps attack surface for penetration testing.
Establishes persistent access in Active Directory environments after domain compromise. Covers DCShadow (rogue DC attribute modification), Skeleton Key (LSASS…
Exploits ADCS through ACL abuse on templates/CA objects and NTLM relay to enrollment endpoints. Covers ESC4 (template ACL → modify to ESC1), ESC5 (PKI object…
Establishes persistence and exploits weak certificate mapping in AD CS. Covers ESC9 (no security extension), ESC10 (weak certificate mapping), ESC12-15…
Exploits misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate any domain user via SAN manipulation or enrollment agent abuse. Covers ESC1 (enrollee…