/credential-recovery
Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover this hash", "offline recovery", "john",
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill credential-recovery --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
- Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
- You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
- Slash command
/credential-recovery
Context preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover this hash", "offline recovery", "john",
SKILL.md
credential-recovery.SKILL.mdname: credential-recovery
description: >
Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill
captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted
files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover
this hash", "offline recovery", "john", "hashcat", "zip2john",
"password-protected file". Do NOT use for online password attacks
(spraying, brute force against services) — use password-spraying instead.
keywords:
- crack
- hash
- hashcat
- john
- zip2john
- office2john
- keepass2john
- ssh2john
- ansible2john
- ansible vault
- rockyou
- wordlist
- offline
- brute force
- NTLM
- Kerberos TGS
- AS-REP
- shadow
- bcrypt
- MSCACHE2
- PKZIP
- password-protected
tools:
- hashcat
- john
- zip2john
- office2john
- pdf2john
- keepass2john
- ssh2john
- 7z2john
- rar2john
- gpg2john
- ansible2john
opsec: low
Credential Cracking
You are helping a penetration tester with offline credential and file cracking. This skill covers hash identification, extraction from encrypted files, and cracking with hashcat or john. All operations are local — no target interaction. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[credential-cracking] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
Scope Boundary
This skill covers offline hash cracking and encrypted file cracking only. It does NOT cover:
- Online password attacks (spraying, brute force) -- use **password-spraying**
- Credential dumping from memory/registry -- use **credential-dumping**
- Password guessing against services -- use **password-spraying**
When cracking is complete, STOP and return to the orchestrator with cracked credentials and recommendations for where to test them.
State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
- Hashes or encrypted files from another skill or user-provided
- **hashcat** (preferred for GPU-accelerated cracking) or **john** (john-jumbo
for `*2john` tools)
- Wordlists — check these locations in order:
1. `/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt` (Kali default — may be a symlink or compressed `.gz`) 2. `/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt` (SecLists location) 3. `/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt.tar.gz` (compressed — extract first: `tar xzf rockyou.txt.tar.gz`) 4. `/opt/seclists/Passwords/` (legacy SecLists path)
**Common issue**: `/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt` is often a broken symlink pointing to `/opt/seclists/...` which doesn't exist. If the symlink is broken, check `/usr/share/seclists/` directly. If rockyou is only available as `.tar.gz`, extract to `$TMPDIR` before use.
**If rockyou.txt is not found at ANY of the above locations** (including compressed variants), STOP immediately. Do not create custom wordlists or generate passwords. Report the failure:
> [credential-cracking] STOPPED — no wordlist found. Checked: > /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt, /usr/share/seclists/Passwords/, > /opt/seclists/Passwords/. Install SecLists or provide a wordlist path.
Return to the orchestrator with this message. The operator must install a wordlist before cracking can proceed.
Sandbox — Disable for All Cracking Commands
hashcat and john need write access to multiple locations: session files (`~/.local/share/hashcat/sessions/`), potfile (`~/.local/share/hashcat/ hashcat.potfile`), restore files (CWD), and temp working files. Redirecting each individually with `--session`, `--potfile-path`, `-o` flags is fragile and often still fails.
**Always run hashcat and john with `dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true`.** This is the only reliable approach in Claude Code's sandboxed environment.
# CORRECT — disable sandbox for all cracking commands
Bash(command="hashcat -m MODE hash.txt wordlist.txt --force",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)
Bash(command="john --wordlist=wordlist.txt hash.txt",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)
# Also for --show after cracking
Bash(command="hashcat -m MODE hash.txt --show",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)**Do not** attempt `$TMPDIR` workarounds first — go straight to sandbox disable. Cracking is a local-only operation with no security implications from disabling the sandbox.
john-jumbo Requirement
Most `*2john` extraction tools ship with **john-jumbo**, not basic john. Check:
john --version 2>&1 | head -1
# Should show "John the Ripper" with "jumbo" in the version string
If john-jumbo is not installed:
# Debian/Ubuntu
sudo apt install john
# Or build from source (last resort)
git clone https://github.com/openwall/john.git
cd john/src && ./configure && make -s clean && make -sj$(nproc)
# Binary at ../run/john
The `*2john` tools are typically in `/usr/share/john/` or alongside the john binary (e.g., `/opt/john/run/zip2john`). Check with:
find /usr -name "zip2john" 2>/dev/null
find /opt -name "zip2john" 2>/dev/null
Step 1: Identify Hash Type
Determine what needs cracking. This come
Read more
name: credential-recovery description: > Offline credential and file recovery with hashcat and john. Use when any skill captures hashes (NTLM, Kerberos TGS/AS-REP, shadow, MSCACHE2) or encrypted files (ZIP, Office, PDF, KeePass, SSH key, 7z, RAR). Trigger phrases: "recover this hash", "offline recovery", "john", "hashcat", "zip2john", "password-protected file". Do NOT use for online password attacks (spraying, brute force against services) — use password-spraying instead. keywords: - crack - hash - hashcat - john - zip2john - office2john - keepass2john - ssh2john - ansible2john - ansible vault - rockyou - wordlist - offline - brute force - NTLM - Kerberos TGS - AS-REP - shadow - bcrypt - MSCACHE2 - PKZIP - password-protected tools: - hashcat - john - zip2john - office2john - pdf2john - keepass2john - ssh2john - 7z2john - rar2john - gpg2john - ansible2john opsec: low
Credential Cracking
You are helping a penetration tester with offline credential and file cracking. This skill covers hash identification, extraction from encrypted files, and cracking with hashcat or john. All operations are local — no target interaction. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[credential-cracking] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
Scope Boundary
This skill covers offline hash cracking and encrypted file cracking only. It does NOT cover:
- Online password attacks (spraying, brute force) -- use **password-spraying**
- Credential dumping from memory/registry -- use **credential-dumping**
- Password guessing against services -- use **password-spraying**
When cracking is complete, STOP and return to the orchestrator with cracked credentials and recommendations for where to test them.
State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
- Hashes or encrypted files from another skill or user-provided
- **hashcat** (preferred for GPU-accelerated cracking) or **john** (john-jumbo
for `*2john` tools)
- Wordlists — check these locations in order:
1. `/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt` (Kali default — may be a symlink or compressed `.gz`) 2. `/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt` (SecLists location) 3. `/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt.tar.gz` (compressed — extract first: `tar xzf rockyou.txt.tar.gz`) 4. `/opt/seclists/Passwords/` (legacy SecLists path)
**Common issue**: `/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt` is often a broken symlink pointing to `/opt/seclists/...` which doesn't exist. If the symlink is broken, check `/usr/share/seclists/` directly. If rockyou is only available as `.tar.gz`, extract to `$TMPDIR` before use.
**If rockyou.txt is not found at ANY of the above locations** (including compressed variants), STOP immediately. Do not create custom wordlists or generate passwords. Report the failure:
> [credential-cracking] STOPPED — no wordlist found. Checked: > /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt, /usr/share/seclists/Passwords/, > /opt/seclists/Passwords/. Install SecLists or provide a wordlist path.
Return to the orchestrator with this message. The operator must install a wordlist before cracking can proceed.
Sandbox — Disable for All Cracking Commands
hashcat and john need write access to multiple locations: session files (`~/.local/share/hashcat/sessions/`), potfile (`~/.local/share/hashcat/ hashcat.potfile`), restore files (CWD), and temp working files. Redirecting each individually with `--session`, `--potfile-path`, `-o` flags is fragile and often still fails.
**Always run hashcat and john with `dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true`.** This is the only reliable approach in Claude Code's sandboxed environment.
# CORRECT — disable sandbox for all cracking commands
Bash(command="hashcat -m MODE hash.txt wordlist.txt --force",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)
Bash(command="john --wordlist=wordlist.txt hash.txt",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)
# Also for --show after cracking
Bash(command="hashcat -m MODE hash.txt --show",
dangerouslyDisableSandbox=true)**Do not** attempt `$TMPDIR` workarounds first — go straight to sandbox disable. Cracking is a local-only operation with no security implications from disabling the sandbox.
john-jumbo Requirement
Most `*2john` extraction tools ship with **john-jumbo**, not basic john. Check:
john --version 2>&1 | head -1 # Should show "John the Ripper" with "jumbo" in the version string
If john-jumbo is not installed:
# Debian/Ubuntu sudo apt install john # Or build from source (last resort) git clone https://github.com/openwall/john.git cd john/src && ./configure && make -s clean && make -sj$(nproc) # Binary at ../run/john
The `*2john` tools are typically in `/usr/share/john/` or alongside the john binary (e.g., `/opt/john/run/zip2john`). Check with:
find /usr -name "zip2john" 2>/dev/null find /opt -name "zip2john" 2>/dev/null
Step 1: Identify Hash Type
Determine what needs cracking. This come
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
Other skills on red-run.
- /acl-abuse
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted Kerberoasting via SPN manipulation, shadow credentials (msDS-KeyCredentialLink → PKINIT), and AdminSDHolder persistence.
Open skill - /ad-discovery
Enumerates Active Directory domains and maps attack surface for penetration testing.
Open skill - /ad-persistence
Establishes persistent access in Active Directory environments after domain compromise. Covers DCShadow (rogue DC attribute modification), Skeleton Key (LSASS master password), custom SSP injection (credential logging via mimilib/memssp), security descriptor backdoors
Open skill - /adcs-access-and-relay
Exploits ADCS through ACL abuse on templates/CA objects and NTLM relay to enrollment endpoints. Covers ESC4 (template ACL → modify to ESC1), ESC5 (PKI object ACLs), ESC7 (ManageCA/ManageCertificates abuse), ESC8 (NTLM relay to HTTP enrollment), ESC11 (NTLM relay to ICPR RPC).
Open skill - /adcs-persistence
Establishes persistence and exploits weak certificate mapping in AD CS. Covers ESC9 (no security extension), ESC10 (weak certificate mapping), ESC12-15 (YubiHSM, issuance policy, altSecIdentities, application policies), Golden Certificate (forge with stolen CA key), certificate
Open skill - /adcs-template-abuse
Exploits misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate any domain user via SAN manipulation or enrollment agent abuse. Covers ESC1 (enrollee supplies subject), ESC2 (any-purpose/no EKU), ESC3 (enrollment agent), ESC6 (EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 CA flag).
Open skill

