/forge-security-review

name: forge-security-review
description: >
  Performs a white-box security review of Atlassian Forge apps using structured, Forge-specific
  security rules and evidence-driven reporting. Use when the user asks for a Forge security
  review, security audit, vuln assessment, pentest-style code review, authz review, tenant
  isolation analysis, web trigger hardening, or static analysis execution for a Forge app.
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
  labels: "forge,security,review,audit,atlassian"
  maintainer: atlassian-developer
  namespace: cloud

Forge Security Review

Runs a Forge-focused white-box security review and reports validated findings with exploitability, impact, evidence, and remediation guidance.

Token-Efficient Default

Use manifest-driven routing by default to reduce token usage. Do not load every rule file up front.

Rule Assets

The review rules are packaged with this skill under `assets/`:

• Global baseline: `assets/security-rules/_global-forge.mdc`
• Category indexes: `assets/security-rules/forge-*/_index-*.mdc`
• Category deep checks: `assets/security-rules/forge-*/*.mdc`
• Deterministic OpenGrep rules: `assets/opengrep-rules/forge-security-rules.yaml` (44 rules). Each rule's `metadata.skill_rule` names the `.mdc` file to apply to its hits.

Execution Mandate

When this skill is triggered:

1. Run the deterministic layer first, from this skill directory:

• `scripts/run_static_analysis.sh <forge-project-root-directory>` (macOS, Linux)
• `scripts/run_static_analysis.ps1 <forge-project-root-directory>` (Windows)

The script runs FSRT and OpenGrep (with the packaged Forge rule packs) and writes everything under `<forge-project-root>/security-audit-artifacts/`: `static-analysis-summary.json`, `fsrt/report.json`, `opengrep/results.json` and `opengrep/results.sarif`, plus a log per tool. Read the summary before anything else. A non-zero exit, or a tool whose status is `not_run`, means that tool did NOT analyse the project: record it as a coverage gap and never treat its missing findings as a clean result. 2. Read `manifest.yml` first before any deep code review. 3. Load `assets/security-rules/_global-forge.mdc` first. 4. Load only relevant category index rules based on manifest and code signals. 5. Load deep subrules only when the matching detection heuristics are triggered by real code patterns or by deterministic findings that point at them. 6. Perform an evidence-based security review across:

• AuthN/AuthZ
• Injection and input validation
• Tenant isolation and cross-tenant leakage
• Secrets and storage
• Egress/remotes/CSP and manifest permissions
• Public entry points (web triggers)
• Agent and miscellaneous Forge security risks

7. Do not modify app code unless the user explicitly requests fixes. 8. Write all scan outputs and generated artifacts to `security-audit-artifacts/`.

Rule Routing Workflow

Phase 1: Reconnaissance (Mandatory)

Read `manifest.yml` first and extract:

• `permissions.scopes`
• `permissions.external.fetch`
• `permissions.content.scripts`
• `modules` (resolver/webtrigger/scheduledTrigger/rovo/etc.)
• `remotes`
• `app.runtime.name`

Build an execution map:

• UI modules -> bridge calls -> resolvers/functions
• External entry points (web triggers, events, schedules)
• `api.asUser()` vs `api.asApp()` paths
• Outbound fetch destinations

Phase 2: Index Rule Selection (Two-Tier Loading)

Always load first:

• `assets/security-rules/_global-forge.mdc`

Then load only relevant category index rules:

| Signal | Load | | --------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Any meaningful scope usage, mutations, or `asApp()` usage | `assets/security-rules/forge-authn-authz/_index-authn-authz.mdc` | | Any module with `access: anonymous` or `unlicensedAccess` | `assets/security-rules/forge-authn-authz/_index-authn-authz.mdc`, and check every storage write reachable from that module | | `webtrigger` or `scheduledTrigger` modules | `assets/security-rules/forge-webtrigger-entrypoints/_index-webtrigger-entrypoints.mdc` | | `apiRoute` or `endpoint` modules | `assets/security-rules/forge-webtrigger-entrypoints/_index-webtrigger-entrypoints.mdc` (externally reachable endpoints; review authn/authz manually) | | `permissions.external.fetch` or `remotes` | `assets/security-rules/forge-egress-remotes/_index-egress-remotes.mdc` (a remote backend is not locally assessable; say so) | | SQL APIs or untrusted input reaching resolver sinks | `assets/security-rules/forge-injection/_index-injection.mdc` | | Multi-tenant patterns, module/global state, cache reuse | `assets/security-rules/forge-tenant-isolation/_index-tenant-isolation.mdc` | | Credentials/tokens/secrets handling | `assets/security-rules/forge-secrets-storage/_index-secrets-storage.mdc` | | Unsafe CSP or likely scope/config misconfiguration | `assets/security-rules/forge-manifest-config/_index-manifest-config.mdc` | | Rovo modules/actions | `assets/security-rules/forge-rovo-agents/_index-rovo-agents.mdc` | | Baseline logging/error/static analysis concerns | `assets/security-rules/forge-auditing/_index-auditing.mdc` | | Dependency/package risk review | `assets/security-rules/forge-misc/_index-misc.mdc` |

Subrule policy:

• After reading an index, load only the subrules that match the detection heuristics observed in code.
• Do not pre-load every subrule in a category.
• Every OpenGrep finding names