ai-ml-attacks
This skill should be used when the user asks about "AI security", "ML pipeline attacks", "prompt injection", "model…
This skill should be used when the user asks about "vulnerability chains", "chained exploits", "multi-step attacks", "SSRF to RCE", "pivot attacks", or needs to identify how vulnerabilities in different components can be combined during whitebox security review.
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill vulnerability-chains -a windsurf -y
name: vulnerability-chains description: This skill should be used when the user asks about "vulnerability chains", "chained exploits", "multi-step attacks", "SSRF to RCE", "pivot attacks", or needs to identify how vulnerabilities in different components can be combined during whitebox security review.
Modern applications consist of multiple services and frameworks. Critical exploits often require chaining vulnerabilities across components.
Single vulnerabilities may have limited impact:
**Chains amplify impact:**
# Find orchestration configs find . -name "docker-compose*.yml" -o -name "supervisord.conf" -o -name "*.k8s.yaml" # Extract service topology grep -E "ports:|expose:|links:|depends_on:" docker-compose.yml # Identify internal-only services grep -E "127\.0\.0\.1:|localhost:" docker-compose.yml supervisord.conf
Pivot vulnerabilities enable reaching other services:
| Pivot Type | What It Enables | |------------|-----------------| | SSRF | Reach internal services | | Header Injection | Modify downstream requests | | Open Redirect | Phishing, OAuth token theft | | Path Traversal | Read configs, source code | | SQL Injection | Read files, execute commands (in some DBs) |
High-impact sinks in each service:
| Sink Type | Impact | |-----------|--------| | Template Injection (SSTI) | RCE | | Command Injection | RCE | | Deserialization | RCE | | SQL Injection | Data breach, sometimes RCE | | File Write | Code execution via webshell |
For each pivot found: 1. What internal services can it reach? 2. What sinks exist in those services? 3. Can attacker-controlled data reach the sink?
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐
│ Next.js │────►│ Flask │────►│ Shell │
│ (SSRF) │ │ (SSTI) │ │ (RCE) │
└─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
│ │
│ Host header │ render_template_string()
│ → internal fetch │ with user input
│ │
▼ ▼
Attacker server Jinja2 payload
redirects to executes code
internal Flask**Detection:** 1. Find SSRF in externally-accessible service (Next.js redirect, fetch with user URL) 2. Find SSTI in internal service (render_template_string) 3. Verify SSRF can reach SSTI endpoint with controllable input
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │ Web App │────►│ 169.254.169.254 │────►│ AWS/GCP │ │ (SSRF) │ │ (Metadata) │ │ (Creds) │ └─────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────┘
**Detection:** 1. Find SSRF capability 2. Check if app runs in cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure) 3. Verify no IMDSv2 or metadata endpoint blocking
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │ SQLi │────►│ LOAD_FILE │────►│ Config │ │ │ │ (MySQL) │ │ Secrets │ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
**Detection:** 1. Find SQL injection 2. Check database type and permissions 3. Identify sensitive file paths (config, .env, etc.)
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │ Middleware │────►│ Admin │────►│ Command │ │ Bypass │ │ Panel │ │ Injection │ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
**Detection:** 1. Find authentication/authorization bypass 2. Identify what protected functionality becomes accessible 3. Audit protected functionality for high-impact vulns
When documenting a chain:
## Chain: [Name] **Impact:** [RCE/Data Breach/Account Takeover/etc.] **Components:** 1. [Service A] - [Vulnerability Type] at [location] 2. [Service B] - [Vulnerability Type] at [location] **Prerequisites:** - [What attacker needs: account, network position, etc.] **Flow:** 1. Attacker [action] → [result] 2. [Result] enables [next action] 3. [Final impact] **Evidence:** - [File:line] - [code snippet] - [File:line] - [code snippet]
During `/full-audit`: 1. **Architecture phase** maps services and connectivity 2. **Threat model** identifies trust boundaries 3. **Deep dive** finds individual vulnerabilities 4. **Chain analysis** connects vulnerabilities across services
Before reporting a chain as exploitable:
AI-powered whitebox penetration testing plugin for Claude Code. 9 languages, 22 skills, 7 autonomous agents. STRIDE threat modeling, OWASP 2025 coverage, polyglot monorepo support.
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