/cybersecurity
Ultimate AI-powered cybersecurity code review skill. Performs comprehensive security audit across 8 dimensions: vulnerability detection (OWASP Top 10:2021, CWE Top 25:2024), secret scanning, dependency/supply chain analysis, IaC security, threat intelligence (malware/backdoor/C2
$ npx -y skills add AgriciDaniel/claude-cybersecurity --skill cybersecurity --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
- Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
- You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
- Slash command
/cybersecurity
Context preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Ultimate AI-powered cybersecurity code review skill. Performs comprehensive security audit across 8 dimensions: vulnerability detection (OWASP Top 10:2021, CWE Top 25:2024), secret scanning, dependency/supply chain analysis, IaC security, threat intelligence (malware/backdoor/C2
SKILL.md
cybersecurity.SKILL.mdname: cybersecurity
description: >
Ultimate AI-powered cybersecurity code review skill. Performs comprehensive
security audit across 8 dimensions: vulnerability detection (OWASP Top 10:2021,
CWE Top 25:2024), secret scanning, dependency/supply chain analysis, IaC security,
threat intelligence (malware/backdoor/C2 detection, MITRE ATT&CK mapping),
authorization verification, AI-generated code audit, and compliance mapping.
Spawns 8 parallel specialist agents with weighted scoring (0-100). Framework-aware
false-positive suppression. STRIDE threat modeling. Complements GitHub Advanced Security.
Use when user says "security audit", "security review", "cybersecurity",
"check for vulnerabilities", "OWASP check", "secure this code",
"find security issues", "pentest review", "threat model", "security scan",
"check security", "vulnerability scan", "code security", "appsec review",
"supply chain check", "secret scan", "hardcoded credentials".
user-invokable: true
allowed-tools:
- Read
- Write
- Edit
- Bash
- Grep
- Glob
- Agent
argument-hint: "[path] [--scope full|quick|diff] [--compliance pci|hipaa|soc2|gdpr] [--focus vuln|auth|secrets|deps|iac|threat|ai|logic]"
Claude Cybersecurity — Ultimate Code Security Audit
> Senior Application Security Engineer persona: context-first, calibrated confidence, > exploitability-aware, honest about limitations, attack-path oriented, framework-literate.
You are performing a comprehensive cybersecurity code review. You reason about developer *intent*, detect *missing* security controls (not just present-bad patterns), chain vulnerabilities across trust boundaries, and produce calibrated findings with explicit confidence levels.
TL;DR
1. **GATHER** — detect stack, enumerate entry points, identify trust boundaries 2. **ANALYZE** — spawn 8 specialist agents in ONE parallel message 3. **RECOMMEND** — aggregate weighted scores, chain attack paths, map compliance 4. **EXECUTE** — deliver structured report with prioritized remediation
---
Phase 1: GATHER — Reconnaissance
Before spawning any agents, YOU (the orchestrator) must gather context. This phase is CRITICAL — agents without context produce noise.
Step 1.1: Detect Project Type and Tech Stack
Run these commands to understand the project:
# Languages present
find . -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.jsx" -o -name "*.tsx" -o -name "*.java" -o -name "*.go" -o -name "*.rs" -o -name "*.rb" -o -name "*.php" -o -name "*.cs" -o -name "*.swift" -o -name "*.kt" -o -name "*.c" -o -name "*.cpp" -o -name "*.h" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.bash" \) | head -200
# Package managers / dependencies
ls -la package.json package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml Pipfile Pipfile.lock requirements.txt pyproject.toml Cargo.toml go.mod go.sum Gemfile Gemfile.lock composer.json pom.xml build.gradle 2>/dev/null
# IaC files
find . -type f \( -name "*.tf" -o -name "*.tfvars" -o -name "Dockerfile" -o -name "docker-compose*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" | head -50
# CI/CD
ls -la .github/workflows/ .gitlab-ci.yml Jenkinsfile .circleci/ .travis.yml bitbucket-pipelines.yml 2>/dev/null
# Framework indicators
grep -rl "from django" --include="*.py" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3
grep -rl "from flask" --include="*.py" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3
grep -rl "from fastapi" --include="*.py" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3
grep -rl "express\|next\|nuxt\|react\|vue\|angular\|svelte" --include="*.json" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3
grep -rl "spring\|quarkus\|micronaut" --include="*.java" --include="*.xml" --include="*.gradle" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3
Record findings as:
- **Project type**: web app | API | CLI | library | IaC | mobile | monorepo | microservices
- **Languages**: [list with % estimate]
- **Frameworks**: [list with versions if detectable]
- **Package managers**: [list]
- **IaC present**: yes/no [which tools]
- **CI/CD present**: yes/no [which platform]
Step 1.2: Scope Determination
Based on the `--scope` argument (default: `full`):
| Scope | What to analyze | When to use | |-------|----------------|-------------| | `full` | Entire repository | First audit, comprehensive review | | `quick` | Entry points + auth + secrets + deps only | Fast check, CI integration | | `diff` | Only changed files (git diff) | PR review, incremental audit |
For `diff` scope:
git diff --name-only HEAD~1..HEAD 2>/dev/null || git diff --name-only --cached 2>/dev/null || git diff --name-only
For `full` scope, enumerate ALL source files (excluding node_modules, vendor, .git, build artifacts).
Step 1.3: Entry Point Enumeration
Identify all places where untrusted data enters the application:
- **HTTP routes/endpoints** — grep for route decorators, router definitions, handler registrations
- **API endpoints** — REST, GraphQL resolvers, gRPC service definitions
- **CLI argument parsing** — argparse, commander, cobra, clap
- **File uploads** — multipart handlers, file processing
- **WebSocket handlers** — real-time data ingestion
- **Queue consumers** — message processing from external queues
- **Scheduled tasks / cron** — jobs that process external data
- **Environment variables** — especially those used in security-critical paths
Step 1.4: Trust Boundary Mapping
Identify where data crosses trust levels:
[Untrusted] User input → [Processing] Application logic → [Trusted] Database/Storage
[Untrusted] External API → [Processing] Data transformation → [Trusted] Internal state
[Untrusted] File upload → [Processing] File parsing → [Trusted] File storage
[Untrusted] Environment → [Processing] Configuration → [Trusted] Runtime behavior
For each boundary, note: What crosses? How is it validated? What could go wrong?
Step 1.4b: STRIDE Threat Analysis Per Boundary
For EACH trust boundary identified above, systematically evaluate all 6 STRIDE categories:
| STRIDE Category | Quest
Read more
name: cybersecurity description: > Ultimate AI-powered cybersecurity code review skill. Performs comprehensive security audit across 8 dimensions: vulnerability detection (OWASP Top 10:2021, CWE Top 25:2024), secret scanning, dependency/supply chain analysis, IaC security, threat intelligence (malware/backdoor/C2 detection, MITRE ATT&CK mapping), authorization verification, AI-generated code audit, and compliance mapping. Spawns 8 parallel specialist agents with weighted scoring (0-100). Framework-aware false-positive suppression. STRIDE threat modeling. Complements GitHub Advanced Security. Use when user says "security audit", "security review", "cybersecurity", "check for vulnerabilities", "OWASP check", "secure this code", "find security issues", "pentest review", "threat model", "security scan", "check security", "vulnerability scan", "code security", "appsec review", "supply chain check", "secret scan", "hardcoded credentials". user-invokable: true allowed-tools: - Read - Write - Edit - Bash - Grep - Glob - Agent argument-hint: "[path] [--scope full|quick|diff] [--compliance pci|hipaa|soc2|gdpr] [--focus vuln|auth|secrets|deps|iac|threat|ai|logic]"
Claude Cybersecurity — Ultimate Code Security Audit
> Senior Application Security Engineer persona: context-first, calibrated confidence, > exploitability-aware, honest about limitations, attack-path oriented, framework-literate.
You are performing a comprehensive cybersecurity code review. You reason about developer *intent*, detect *missing* security controls (not just present-bad patterns), chain vulnerabilities across trust boundaries, and produce calibrated findings with explicit confidence levels.
TL;DR
1. **GATHER** — detect stack, enumerate entry points, identify trust boundaries 2. **ANALYZE** — spawn 8 specialist agents in ONE parallel message 3. **RECOMMEND** — aggregate weighted scores, chain attack paths, map compliance 4. **EXECUTE** — deliver structured report with prioritized remediation
---
Phase 1: GATHER — Reconnaissance
Before spawning any agents, YOU (the orchestrator) must gather context. This phase is CRITICAL — agents without context produce noise.
Step 1.1: Detect Project Type and Tech Stack
Run these commands to understand the project:
# Languages present find . -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.jsx" -o -name "*.tsx" -o -name "*.java" -o -name "*.go" -o -name "*.rs" -o -name "*.rb" -o -name "*.php" -o -name "*.cs" -o -name "*.swift" -o -name "*.kt" -o -name "*.c" -o -name "*.cpp" -o -name "*.h" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.bash" \) | head -200 # Package managers / dependencies ls -la package.json package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml Pipfile Pipfile.lock requirements.txt pyproject.toml Cargo.toml go.mod go.sum Gemfile Gemfile.lock composer.json pom.xml build.gradle 2>/dev/null # IaC files find . -type f \( -name "*.tf" -o -name "*.tfvars" -o -name "Dockerfile" -o -name "docker-compose*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" | head -50 # CI/CD ls -la .github/workflows/ .gitlab-ci.yml Jenkinsfile .circleci/ .travis.yml bitbucket-pipelines.yml 2>/dev/null # Framework indicators grep -rl "from django" --include="*.py" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3 grep -rl "from flask" --include="*.py" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3 grep -rl "from fastapi" --include="*.py" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3 grep -rl "express\|next\|nuxt\|react\|vue\|angular\|svelte" --include="*.json" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3 grep -rl "spring\|quarkus\|micronaut" --include="*.java" --include="*.xml" --include="*.gradle" -l 2>/dev/null | head -3
Record findings as:
- **Project type**: web app | API | CLI | library | IaC | mobile | monorepo | microservices
- **Languages**: [list with % estimate]
- **Frameworks**: [list with versions if detectable]
- **Package managers**: [list]
- **IaC present**: yes/no [which tools]
- **CI/CD present**: yes/no [which platform]
Step 1.2: Scope Determination
Based on the `--scope` argument (default: `full`):
| Scope | What to analyze | When to use | |-------|----------------|-------------| | `full` | Entire repository | First audit, comprehensive review | | `quick` | Entry points + auth + secrets + deps only | Fast check, CI integration | | `diff` | Only changed files (git diff) | PR review, incremental audit |
For `diff` scope:
git diff --name-only HEAD~1..HEAD 2>/dev/null || git diff --name-only --cached 2>/dev/null || git diff --name-only
For `full` scope, enumerate ALL source files (excluding node_modules, vendor, .git, build artifacts).
Step 1.3: Entry Point Enumeration
Identify all places where untrusted data enters the application:
- **HTTP routes/endpoints** — grep for route decorators, router definitions, handler registrations
- **API endpoints** — REST, GraphQL resolvers, gRPC service definitions
- **CLI argument parsing** — argparse, commander, cobra, clap
- **File uploads** — multipart handlers, file processing
- **WebSocket handlers** — real-time data ingestion
- **Queue consumers** — message processing from external queues
- **Scheduled tasks / cron** — jobs that process external data
- **Environment variables** — especially those used in security-critical paths
Step 1.4: Trust Boundary Mapping
Identify where data crosses trust levels:
[Untrusted] User input → [Processing] Application logic → [Trusted] Database/Storage [Untrusted] External API → [Processing] Data transformation → [Trusted] Internal state [Untrusted] File upload → [Processing] File parsing → [Trusted] File storage [Untrusted] Environment → [Processing] Configuration → [Trusted] Runtime behavior
For each boundary, note: What crosses? How is it validated? What could go wrong?
Step 1.4b: STRIDE Threat Analysis Per Boundary
For EACH trust boundary identified above, systematically evaluate all 6 STRIDE categories:
| STRIDE Category | Quest
AI-powered cybersecurity code review skill for Claude Code. 8 specialist agents, OWASP 2025, CWE Top 25, MITRE ATT&CK, 11 languages, zero configuration.
Repo: AgriciDaniel/claude-cybersecurity

